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RECONSIDERATION OF GEORGE ELIOT

Correspondence—"German Opinion" and "Responsibility of Generals."

WILLIAM C. ATKINSON

SIR HAROLD BUTLER

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SIRDAR IKBAL ALI SHAH

A. F. WILLS

BEN. S. MORRIS

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
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THE FORTNIGHTLY

AUGUST, 1947

THE IDEA OF LATIN AMERICA

BY WILLIAM C. ATKINSON

NOTHING so impresses the visitor to Latin America to-day as the range and depth of current preoccupation with the problems of what may be called, in the widest sense of the term, the "spiritual" rôle and destiny of the New World. The traditional European conception of this continent depicts it as a mere offshoot and prolongation of the civilization of Spain and Portugal. That conception has always involved a curious disregard for certain basic factors which transcend even community of language, of religion and of social organization. It has now long outlived its earlier relative validity, and calls for recognition as the anachronism it is. Of recent years we have seen Falangist Spain, with its crude "Hispanity" campaign, seek to capitalize for the mother-country some of the old prestige and the moral leadership of pre-emancipation days. The failure of the campaign throws into sharp focus, not merely the incurable myopia of Spain in her relations with America, but the instinctive repudiation by a score of nations, firmly convinced that they march in the van of human progress, of any claim to tutelage by one whose ideology is essentially medieval.

But those strange terms that stud the intellectual horizon across the Atlantic—Chilenity, Peruanity, Mexicanity and the rest—are not merely a *riposte* to "Hispanity". Nor are they simply an affirmation of nationality, the attempt to create that national consciousness without which political sovereignty must still sound hollow. They represent a new and a searching inquiry into the fundamentals of nationhood, into the complexities of ethnology and environment, of tradition, temperament and aptitudes; they are a search for reality, resting on more than a suspicion that the "reality" of the Hispanic traditionalists is part myth and, even where true in the past, in large part untenable after a century and a quarter of independence. One result must inevitably be to underline the differences between these many nations, differences often as profound as those separating the divers peoples of Europe, to whom too a common creed and even a common language across frontiers are not unknown. But another and more significant one will be the elaboration of a new concept of Latin America as a whole, in which the Iberian heritage will be but one ingredient of several.

Something of this was already glimpsed by Canning in 1823. His famous "calling of a New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old" was more than a mere variant of his resolve that, if France were to have Spain,

"it should be Spain without the Indies". The one is positive as the other is negative. It recognizes moreover something as existing in its own right, and above all something new, that may no more be held a replica than a dependency of the old. Independence, though accompanied by a natural fervour of repudiation of all things Spanish, did not of itself bring any thorough-going revision of values in the ex-colonies. As the century progressed, the fear that they might prove to have shaken off political dependence on Spain only to fall into economic dependence on the United States led indeed to a deliberate stressing and closing of cultural links with Europe. The *Ariel* (1900) of the great Uruguayan José Enrique Rodó is the most eloquent expression of this phase of Latin-American thought. A blend of the Hellenic and the Christian traditions, it sought to engage Latin America in a preferential pursuit of the things of the spirit, represented by Europe, in conscious opposition to the formula "Washington *plus* Edison".

Then came the 1914-1918 war, with its threatened collapse of European values and its invocation, in succour of these, of military and moral support from both the Americas; and a powerful stimulus was given to the emergence of a new independence of criteria and to the search for the elements of an autochthonous tradition. The "University Reform" of 1918 which, beginning in Argentina, straightway spread across the Plate to Uruguay and then over the Andes to Chile, Peru and beyond, was perhaps the most conscious rejection of a European intellectual inheritance and a convincing demonstration of the extent to which, in given directions, this had become stagnant and unserviceable. And now that, for the second time in a generation, the New World has been called in not merely to restore the balance of the Old but to help preserve from destruction all that this stands for, less and less is heard of "Arielism" and of cultural dependence on Europe. This does not mean any readier acceptance of the cultural values of the North. But the North at least is America, and has achieved something distinct from Europe. Why should not the Centre and the South, with so much stronger grounds for differentiation, achieve as much?

This present spirit of inquiry in Latin America, it may pertinently be recalled, was paralleled in an earlier age by much keen polemical discussion among scientists and scholars in Europe. Buffon, it will be remembered, threw the first pebble into the waters with his theory of the "immaturity" of the New World, based on the striking absence there of the greater mammals. A continent without the elephant, the rhinoceros, the hippopotamus, the camel, the dromedary, the giraffe, with fewer than sixty quadrupeds, when the Old World knew 130, a continent where animals transplanted from Europe or common to both sides of the Atlantic all, "without exception," showed a falling-off from European standards, and where native man comes off even worse from the comparison: all this argued not so much a hostile Nature as a Nature weak and undeveloped, a continent, in short, but recently emerged from the waste of ocean. Vast areas of it were still under water, others were marsh—Buffon stressed the proliferation of insect life as nowhere else in the world. The two

nearest approaches to civilization discovered in America, those of the Aztecs and the Incas, were found precisely on the high tableland of Mexico and in the Andes of Peru. (Bacon had already hinted at the alternative explanation with his thesis of fugitive survivors from the waters.) A certain vacillation in Buffon between immaturity and degeneracy, as the clue to such a degree of divergence, is magnified in the writings of those who followed. America was now very young, now very old, now both together, as the Abbé Raynal argued ingeniously, postulating a late re-birth after eclipse: "Doubtless it was peopled at the same time as the Old World, but the flood may have overtaken it at a later date."

Meanwhile the Indian himself was becoming a pawn in the famous eighteenth-century debate between the critics and the defenders of organized society. Rousseau's generous enthusiasm for the noble savage had notable antecedents. The Brazilian natives whom Montaigne encountered in Rouen in 1555 had already profoundly disturbed some traditional concepts: they moved Montaigne to a first criticism of hereditary monarchy, and of capitalism, and may be allowed thereby some part in the genesis of Marxism. The Prussian De Pauw, sustaining now the contrary thesis, would have none of Buffon's "immaturity": the Indian showed what man became apart from society—a degenerate. Around De Pauw the storm of controversy raged. Voltaire, Marmontel, Galiani, Hume and many another tossed the aborigine to and fro, until from across the North Atlantic Thomas Jefferson, author of the "Declaration of Independence", brought the theorists down to fact with his own first-hand experience of Redskins: "The inferiority of the Indian is due exclusively to circumstances and not to nature; it is due to his way of life, his inadequate diet, his exposure to constant danger and exhausting physical labours." Jefferson poured scorn on the suggestion that Nature had sided with those born on one side of the Atlantic against the other. The more perspicacious European minds had already sensed, in the immaturity of the New World alongside the senescence of the Old, something of the vast potentialities of youth. Galiani, foretelling even before 1776 the westward shift of the centre of gravity of the Anglo-Saxon world, was moved by the events of that year to reflect: "The time has come of the total collapse of Europe and of the transmigration to America. Everything is falling in decay around us, religion, laws, arts, sciences, and everything will be built up again from the foundations in America." Even Raynal had written prophetically: "If some happy revolution ever takes place on the earth, it will be due to America. This New World, having been devastated, must flourish in its turn *and perhaps even rule over the Old*; it will be the refuge of our peoples victimized by politics or driven out by wars; its savages will become civilized, and men oppressed in other lands will there know freedom once again."

In all this debate there was common ground at least in the assumption that, whatever the New World signified, that something was *sui generis*. Spain and

Portugal had been in possession for over two centuries, but it occurred to none to hold Central and South America simply an extension of the Iberian Peninsula. Such a contention could only have been justified, and can only be justified to-day, on the basis of one of two pre-conditions: either the virtual extermination of the native populations, or their complete and willing absorption into the full inheritance of Iberian civilization. It is because neither of these conditions holds that Latin America is at long last emboldened, not merely, as with the eighteenth-century encyclopaedists, to ignore the contention, but to challenge it.

The New World has witnessed three great experiments in the creation of new societies, the English, the Spanish and the Portuguese. The conditions the early colonists found, of geography, climate, native races, had much to do with what each made of the experiment; but much too depended on what they themselves were and what they sought. The men of the *Mayflower* sought religious freedom. Of the natives they asked only the modest territories necessary for their new home, and as they were drawn neither by the lure of gold nor by any desire to impose their faith on others, white man and Indian went each his separate way. The Spaniard sought gold, which entailed, first, conquest, and, this achieved, native labour. He went imbued too with the crusader's zeal for the propagation of his faith, holding justified all means necessary to that end. The Portuguese, as is well known, went to America by accident and consequently without a motive. A third of a century elapsed between that first contrary wind of 1500 and the first settlement in 1532, a third of a century during which we may imagine Portugal debating with herself whether she was really intended, or interested, to be there at all. If therefore it be of the essence of virtue in a virtuous action that it be void of ulterior motive, the Portuguese launched their enterprise in Brazil under the fairest auspices of all.

Portuguese and Spaniard were however at one in this, and it constitutes the vital difference between Anglo-Saxon and Latin America: unlike the Puritan settlers, who went as families accompanied by their womenfolk and endowed thereby with their own social sufficiency, they were explorers, *conquistadores*, who for reasons of polity as well as of instinct had no alternative but to consort with the women of the races they subdued. In this they were helped by a notable absence of race- or colour-prejudice, the fruit of eight centuries of contact with Islam and Africa in the Peninsula and, for Portugal, of her pioneering experiences in Africa and the East. While, therefore, Anglo-Saxon America is white with insignificant Indian reservations and a clearly defined Negro element in the South, and the half-breed is an isolated phenomenon of no social standing, Latin America is essentially the continent of the half-caste, a racial medley of white, Indian, Negro, mestizo (descendant of white and Indian), mulatto (of white and Negro), zambo (of Indian and Negro) and of the endless permutations and combinations of all these. In countries like

Ecuador and Bolivia some eighty per cent. of the population is Indian or mestizo. In Mexico and Peru the figure is ninety per cent. or more. And the Indian blood in the mestizo generally far out-weighs the white. In Brazil close on twenty of the forty-five million inhabitants are non-whites, more than five million being pure Negroes. In Paraguay Spanish is merely one language out of four, having failed over four centuries to oust the native Guaraní, Quechua and Aymará. Quechua is still the tongue of five million Latin Americans, which is the population of Chile, or of Ecuador and Uruguay combined. The European tradition, in a word, means little or nothing to some seventy-five per cent of the 130 millions who inhabit Latin America.

What is perhaps even more significant is that the new critical attitude towards that tradition, if indeed it finds most forthright expression in the predominantly mestizo countries, springs not from the oppressed native masses themselves but from the dominant white and near-white minorities, from the favoured products of that tradition and those who by education and training are best able to assess it. What is the gravamen of their criticism? Let it be remembered first that the discovery of the Indies was held by Spain at the time as divine recompense for her eight centuries of struggle against Islam, and—in the field it offered for proselytism—as compensation for the inroads of the infidel in Europe. The gold of the Indies was coveted to buttress Spanish policies in Europe, and mercantile policy deliberately subordinated the agriculture, industry and commerce of the New World to those of Spain. Colonial legislation was often generous to a fault—in intention. Many indeed were found to argue with Sepúlveda that the Indians were slaves by nature and—since the Aristotelian doctrine that some men are born to be slaves conflicted with the teaching of Christianity—to level against them monstrous accusations of bestiality, thus salving their consciences by denying to them human status.

Across the Atlantic it was the reality that counted. The Indian was free in law; he became a serf in practice. From 1501, with the introduction of Africans, serfs in theory and in practice, human flesh was admittedly an article of merchandise. The first Europeans carried feudalism to America just when it was dying out in Europe; they introduced a cultural tradition, typified by the Inquisition, that was already parting company with the new trends of Renaissance and Reformation thought, and they imposed an administrative and legal system that ignored the structure and the interests of native society. The Indian was not overthrown by any racial or ethical superiority of the European; he was overthrown because the European possessed gunpowder. It was a purely military victory. Nor did the Spaniard ever succeed in demonstrating that the civilization he brought was superior, in the Indian's own interests, to those he destroyed. In imposing it by force, moreover, he offended against every biological principle. Law in Latin America preceded custom, dogma and forced conversion preceded the birth of faith, grammar preceded language. Now time has taken its revenge, and Latin America pays the penalty in a society

where the letter is constantly at variance with the spirit.

Soon the creoles, Spaniards born in America, added their dissatisfaction: by the reservation of high office for Spaniards from Spain they found themselves reduced to a second-rate citizenship. And the reason for the discrimination is clear. Spaniards born in America were already something other than Spaniards. They were Americans, the product of their environment, and at one with Indian and mestizo in subscribing only under compulsion to the furthering of Spanish interests. In the beginning it was the Spanish authorities on the spot who had defeated the intentions of distant Madrid with the famous formula: "*Se obedece pero no se cumple*" ("I obey but I do not comply"). Towards the end Madrid too is wedded to a policy of obscurantism. "*No conviene ilustrar a los americanos*," said Charles III: "it is undesirable that the Americans should be enlightened." And Charles III is accepted as the most progressive of the eighteenth-century Spanish Bourbons.

Spain, in brief, gave to America all that she was capable of giving. If she did not give what she did not herself possess, religious and intellectual tolerance, the spirit of compromise, a constant co-ordinating of civic rights and responsibilities, a true conception of government as the art of teaching men to govern themselves, to state this is not to formulate an indictment but to record a fact. It has become fashionable in Spain, in assuagement of the bitterness of loss of empire, to argue that the rebellious individualism that impelled the colonies eventually to revolt was perhaps their most Spanish trait, and that their ultimate freedom was thus one more gift from the motherland. Bolívar on his death-bed could see no cause for gratitude here. "America," he wrote in the moment of his bitterest despair, "is ungovernable. Those who have served the revolution have ploughed the sea. If ever it were possible for a part of the world to relapse into primitive chaos, that would be the last phase of America." There, in the political and social sphere, he saw the true heritage of Spain. And if, over a century and a quarter, Latin America has been painfully learning to govern herself, her successive achievements on that thorny and uphill road represent so many victories over the Latin part of her American self.

The emancipation is to Latin America her Renaissance. The New World to-day is more cautious than was eighteenth-century Europe over accepting analogies with the Old. But in so far as the analogy may serve an illustrative turn, the temptation is strong to many thinkers in Latin America to regard the three centuries of the colonial epoch as her Middle Ages, a long sleep from which she is now awakening to the re-discovery of her true self. That self is compounded first of the inevitable effect of environment on character and society. It is now accepted as a truism even by Spaniards that the Spaniard—and the Portuguese—became a new man as soon as he settled in the New World. There was more to it than politics when the creoles in revolt stressed their spiritual kinship with the Indian and on occasion affected Indian names,

more than "literature" when the greatest poet of the New World, Rubén Darío, who had Indian blood in his veins, wrote: "If there is any poetry to be found in our America it is in the old things, in Palenque and Uxatlán, in the legendary Indian, in the refined and sensual Inca, in the great Moctezuma of the golden throne." Deep down, in the blood, like was calling unto like. Creole, mestizo and Indian are together sons of the earth, of the same earth, America. It is for this reason that in a country like Chile, where the Indian represents, numerically, a mere two per cent. of the population, the keen observer, alike Chilean and foreign, can still speak of his "ubiquitous presence". "The Chileans," wrote Keyserling, "have no longer anything Latin about them. A new people is being born in Chile which is more Araucanian than Spanish." Argentina and Uruguay are the "white" countries *par excellence*—with the increasing influx of heterogeneous elements from all over Europe, and beyond, the term "Spanish" or even "Latin" is undergoing constant dilution—yet the appreciation and revalorization of the autochthonous strain even here is one of the most marked aspects of recent sociological inquiry.

But Americanism rests not merely on the conditioning factors born of environment. The European Renaissance signified in the first place the re-discovery of an earlier civilization and a return to its ideals. In the New World the parallel breaks down inasmuch as the civilizations of Mayas, Aztecs, Incas, Chibchas were non-literary; their achievements do not lie in the realm of the mind, and they are incapable accordingly of liberating spiritual energies and idealisms of revolutionary significance in the modern world. They were none the less civilizations, and the Indian, who has never acquiesced in their destruction and who is admitted to-day by his conquerors to have lost rather than gained after four centuries of "Europeanization", looks back to them with pride, and forward, not altogether without hope, to a measure of social and cultural *revanche*. He is strongest to-day precisely where his forbears achieved most, in Mexico, Peru, and the Andean countries generally. In Mexico, with the great social revolution of 1910, the *revanche* is already well under way, and the rehabilitation of the indigenous element as rightful owners of the lands seized by the despoilers is as notably enshrined in the Constitution of 1917 as it is in the murals of Diego Rivera. In Peru APRA ("Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana"), the one indigenous political philosophy that Latin America has produced, is a forthright assertion of Indo-against Latin-Americanism. The thesis of Indian and mestizo degeneracy, so popular in the time of Rodó and the "Arielists", is to-day a thing of the past, and autochthonous values are recognized as possessed of outstanding qualities not merely of survival but of assimilation. The "Indianizing" of the Spaniard in these countries is a well-attested phenomenon. For the rest, it is clear that in any country where the vast majority of the population is Indian or mestizo, on the day when political democracy becomes a reality the future will no longer be in the hands of a numerically insignificant white minority.

It would be gravely misleading to think of a Latin America animated and even divided to-day by conflicting racial ideologies, to picture countries of resurgent Indianism, violently at odds with European tradition, alongside predominantly white countries liable to be provoked in self-defence to a renewal of earlier oppressive methods against the indigenous element. The reality is at once more simple and more complex. Such is the infinite shading from white to brown or black that nowhere can clear-cut racial lines be drawn; and in the result the entire continent is concerned rather to take stock of the situation as it is, to aim at social justice for the dispossessed masses, victims of four hundred years of incomprehension, on in the interest of all to draw on the constructive capacities of all for the common weal. The major crime of the *conquistadores*, their true sin against the light, was the attempt to destroy civilizations not as inferior but as different. The civilization of Latin America henceforth will not be a reversal to these, but neither will it be a Latin civilization. The *homo americanus* is already a blend of Indian, European, African, and one happily superior to the petty racialisms of the Old World. Himself still at a loss to define the differential characteristics of his mind and outlook, he is confident at least that these must fructify into something distinctive. Meanwhile, he asks of Europe recognition of the fact that the leading strings which bound him once to Spain, to Portugal, to Latinity, have long since been cut. Whatever the impress that remains, there is no longer subservience. "Latin America" has become a misnomer, dangerous because it is deceptive. The New World has come of age, and her debt to a European past can never again outweigh her responsibility to an American future, which must be a future for all her sons, the seventy-five no less than the twenty-five per cent. It cannot fail to be an intensely interesting New World.

(The author, who is Stevenson Professor of Spanish at Glasgow University, has recently returned from a lengthy visit to Latin America.)

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THREE VIEWS ON THE MARSHALL OFFER

I. EUROPE'S NEED

THE Marshall offer suddenly presented Europe with a new hope and a new incentive. The pulse of recovery, which in many European countries as in Britain, had been beating strongly up to the end of last year, had been weakening during the past six months. The economic exhaustion of the war was proving far greater than either patients or doctors had at first imagined. The blood transfusion effected by the beneficent operations of UNRRA in eastern Europe and by the American loans in western Europe was coming to an end, but the anaemia was still there. Though collapse had so far been staved off, it was still an imminent possibility, unless the artificial stimulus could be maintained. Without that the prospects for the winter were grim indeed. If the flow of American food, raw materials and capital goods dried up, because there were no more dollars to pay for them, the result might be catastrophic for Europe, and might even be the beginning of a recession in the United States, which would be catastrophic for everybody.

The Marshall offer sprang from a realization of these things. It gave Europe fresh hope of further American aid, but only on condition that Europe made a collective effort to help itself. For a long time past thinking Europeans all over the continent had realized that its division into twenty-five watertight compartments was under modern strategic and industrial conditions a political anomaly and an economic anachronism. If instead of indulging in suicidal struggles its 300 million people had worked together to organize their resources and those of their colonial dependencies into a coherent economic system, they might have achieved not only much higher standards of living for themselves, but an economic position in the world comparable to that of the United States. The need for unity had been made even more obvious by the disastrous impoverishment produced by the war, and now the United States was actually providing a powerful incentive to initiate the process.

But Europe was not its own master. It had finally lost its old predominance, which would have allowed it to reform itself on its own lines. It was divided by a rigid arbitrary line into two halves, and the eastern half lay under the shadow of the new Russian imperialism, whose expansionist ambitions were unlikely to favour any move towards unification. On the contrary, a complete breakdown of European economy might create those anarchical conditions, which are supposed to favour the advance of Communism, and if at

the same time a slump overtook the United States, the conquest of Europe without war might yet be accomplished. These were generally believed to be the guiding notions of the Kremlin, and Mr. Molotov's brusque negative at Paris went far to confirm the belief. Europe was refused the right to work out its own salvation, except under pain of incurring Russian displeasure.

There was not much doubt that left to themselves all the countries of Europe would eagerly come together to work out their economic requirements and to ascertain how far they could meet them by their own common efforts before calling for outside help. The lead given by Mr. Bevin and Mr. Bidault was enthusiastically welcomed not only in the west but also in the east, because it offered the prospect of sorely needed material aid, while responding to a historical need of the times. Europeans were beginning to see that a divided Europe could never recover its prosperity and might not even survive at all. Moreover apart from the dreams of a united Europe, to which they were now invited to give practical shape, there was no escape from the present chaos without once more drawing western and eastern Europe together and without once more integrating Germany with the economy of both. The natural outlet for the agricultural surpluses or the timber and pulp of Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia was not the U.S.S.R. any more than it was the United States, but the industrial areas of Germany, Italy and Britain. In their turn these eastern countries were in desperate need of tractors, fertilizers, clothing and consumer goods of all kinds, much of which could largely be supplied by central and western Europe, but which the U.S.S.R. is incapable of supplying. The same was true of the equipment which they need to develop their water-power, to build new roads and railways, to relieve the congestion of the countryside by industrialization. Imposing "plans" had been announced by the Bulgarian, Polish and Yugoslav Governments for doing some of these things, but they were likely to remain largely paper exercises without the help of the west—and the west means not only the United States, but also western Europe. The eastern countries have no means of producing the steel, the turbines, the locomotives, the electrical machinery and other capital equipment, without which they can neither procure a healthy economic balance nor lift their peoples out of their chronic poverty.

But they had to ask whether they would be allowed to do this. Like the Czechs, while they punctiliously went through the motions of obeisance to the east, they were looking wistfully westwards over their shoulders. Of course they wanted to take their part in the plan for rebuilding Europe, because it afforded them the only real hope of reasonably rapid recovery. Of course they knew that Russia, which was struggling against the paralyzing effects of even greater dislocation and devastation, could not possibly furnish them with the markets or the capital goods or the technical services, upon which that recovery depended. Of course they knew in their hearts that under a joint European plan they would be protected against American interference in their internal

affairs, if they ever took that bogey seriously. Knowing all this, they were no doubt sorely tempted to accept the Anglo-French invitation and once more take the train to Paris. But it was not to be. Russia imposed her veto so irresistibly that even the Czechs, who had actually bought their tickets, abandoned the journey. The Eastern countries had to turn sadly away and put the best face on it which they could.

Whatever the result of the Paris meeting, it will mark a new phase in eastern Europe. By killing their best chance of rapid recovery the Soviet Government has made itself directly responsible for the miseries and hardships of its satellites. This is unlikely to redound to the popularity of Communism, especially if in western Europe prosperity begins to revive by the conjugation of its own efforts with American assistance.

In one other respect the Russian rejection of any European plan implies a change in the grouping of political forces. Aware of the serious plight of the country, French opinion appears to be overwhelmingly in favour of making the most of the Marshall offer. Russian obstruction has therefore weakened the communist opposition and has swung the French Government into closer collaboration with Britain and the United States. A prospect of finding a joint solution of the problem of the Ruhr and of the relation between French and the Anglo-American zones has thus been opened up, without which the reconstruction either of western Europe or of Europe as a whole is impossible. There is little hope for either, unless their needs are assessed not by each nation in isolation but by international bodies armed with real authority.

The dollar shortage affects every country and every group of countries in Europe except Switzerland. Their needs for food, electric power, coal, steel and other raw materials cannot be successfully surveyed or met, except by joint action. The task of allocating priorities and of pooling resources will be immensely difficult. To enable the goods needed for recovery to flow freely from one country to another will demand some relaxation of the trade prohibitions, quotas, customs duties, and most-favoured-nation rights, which will not be easy. But thanks to the Marshall offer an impulse has been given, which may generate the collective will necessary to overcome these obstacles. The European community has been stimulated by Mr. Bevin's energetic lead, for without British initiative little or nothing could probably have been done. Though the Russian veto has debarred the whole of Europe from participating in the common enterprise, a beginning in the west will afford it a better hope than has yet been offered it. If it is resolutely grasped under the leadership of Britain and France, the present opportunity may prove to be a turning point in the decayed fortunes of Europe. If it is frittered away in sterile debate and discord, the continent may well fall into decline leading fatally to irremediable collapse.

II. THE ECONOMIC ANGLE

MANY commentators on Mr. Marshall's aid-to-Europe proposals have presented the new American move as Europe's last chance. To be accurate, this interpretation must be qualified. In the first place, the statement is true only to the extent that it refers to Western Europe. Secondly, if the Marshall proposals are Europe's last chance to survive within the political, economic and social framework familiar to the present generation, they are also America's last chance to maintain her present economic and social structure. However much Europe may be in need of American goods and, therefore, of dollars to pay for them, the United States, as long as it is bent on preserving an unplanned economy based on "free enterprise", multilateral trade and the rest, is hardly less in need of maintaining an outlet for a substantial part of her national product. But if there are two "last chances", complementary in their aspects, there is a difference in the speed with which they must be seized. For Europe, with no reserves left, the problem is one of overcoming desperate scarcities; for America, it is the problem of overcoming an abundance that grows increasingly embarrassing and cannot be disposed of as long as she maintains her present economic framework. The urgency of Europe's problem is obviously far greater. But, in the long run, the American problem is equally serious. For, unless the Marshall proposals lead to some peacetime system of lend-lease, to use once more Mr. Roosevelt's camouflage terms for gifts, America, cannot in the end, any more than Europe, escape economic, hence political and social, upheaval.

Mr. Churchill notwithstanding, there are no unsordid acts in either economics or politics. And from the economic angle, the American proposals foreshadow another "Act to promote the Defence of the United States", which is the title, too frequently forgotten, of the first Lend-Lease Act on the American statute book. The new American approach is quite evidently compelled by sheer economic necessity. Even prosperous Sweden, a non-belligerent in 1939-1945, had to cut her imports from the dollar area some weeks ago, because of dwindling dollar reserves. What was, in Sweden's case, a move dictated by caution more than by immediate necessity, is for the European ex-belligerents a matter of the most desperate urgency. Their situation is indeed such that their dollar reserves will be completely exhausted within the next nine to fifteen months at the latest. True, total U.S. exports may not represent more than from seven to eight per cent. of American production. But a substantial contraction of exports may in adverse conditions make all the difference between a recession and a slump, between a slump and a catastrophe in American economy.

The approaching exhaustion of dollar reserves comes as no surprise to the critics of the Bretton Woods economic philosophy and its concrete manifestations such as the U.S. loan agreements with Britain and France. Were the

subject less serious, they could to-day indulge in quoting some of the more foolish statements of the apologists of Bretton Woods. Even before the meeting of the Bretton Woods conference (July 1944), it was evident that American economic policy, as it was then conceived, would be inadequate to cope with the difficulties certain to confront world economy at the end of the 1939-1945 war. What Lord Keynes conceded of the loan to Britain—that it was "cut too fine"—applied to the whole American post-war programme. For one must not look at the amount, in absolute figures, of American credits to Britain, France and other countries, but rather at the needs, even then discernible, of devastated Europe. As one can see now—as some predicted even then—it was not possible to achieve "on the cheap" the American object of reviving the multilateral system of international trade. And, in particular, it was impossible to do so without tackling the central problem of present-day world economy, that is, the enormous surplus in the U.S. balance of payments which America's debtors for years past—indeed for decades—have been unable to settle by the natural means of paying in goods and services.

So much has lately been written on this subject that one hesitates to revert to it. But it is perhaps worth recalling that during the years 1919-1939, the consolidated U.S. balance of payments showed a total surplus of \$14,450 million on current transactions (mainly derived from the export surplus of the U.S. balance of trade). The debtors of the U.S. had to settle this balance, *grosso modo*, by transfers of gold amounting to \$10,900 million, only the rest being covered by American credits.* During the years 1942-1944, the U.S. balance of payments showed, temporarily, a deficit, as Lend-Lease supplies called for no financial settlement. With the end of Lend-Lease (August 1945), a new surplus arose: \$4,200 million in 1945, \$8,200 million in 1946. That surplus could only be balanced by American credits (\$1,800 million in 1945, \$3,300 million in 1946) and generous relief and rehabilitation gifts (\$4,300 million in 1945, \$3,200 million in 1946). Both these sources are irregular in flow and precarious in nature. As to the current year, the surplus now accumulating is likely to beat all previous records.

The Bretton Woods system was evidently not designed to cope with a problem of such magnitude. The International Monetary Fund, in particular, was not intended to deal with a "fundamental" disequilibrium in the balance of payments of a member country. Yet, the deficits of America's debtors are obviously for the most part "fundamental": they have lasted for over two decades and have constantly grown worse. Nor is the World Bank, with its limited capital and the restrictions imposed on its lending policy by its articles of agreement, capable of providing the solution, the fact apart that American bankers, for obvious reasons, show little inclination to help the Bank break their own lending monopoly. The third gear in the Bretton Woods mechan-

* Figures from *The United States in the World Economy*, table I at end of volume, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, 1943.

ism, the International Trade Organization—the creation of which is still problematic and which was the subject of a recent conference meeting at Geneva—could not, even if successful, produce sufficiently quick results in breaking down trade barriers to stave off the catastrophe which threatens at short term.

The new American proposals are realistic in that they recognize, by implication at least, that the Bretton Woods programme has failed. But will this new deal for Europe support for which is at present confined to the American executive, be endorsed by Congress? And if it is so endorsed, does it dispose of the problem of the U.S. balance of payments? And thirdly, what of the Russian attitude? These three questions arise inevitably on any examination of the new approach.

That a scheme should be logical and necessary, even from the American angle, is not in itself sufficient reason for its adoption by a legislative body dominated in its considerations, particularly in 1947, by short-term electoral motives. It is, in the last resort the attitude of the electors which will be decisive and their attitude will largely depend on whether Europe or at least a large part of Europe puts forth a bold and economically plausible plan for reconstruction. Perhaps, they can be "sold on the idea" that an insurance premium representing no more than about three per cent. of present-day U.S. national income is a small sum to sacrifice for a number of years if it protects world economy from total, and U.S. economy from at least partial, breakdown. If so, Congress may follow suit. But it would be foolish to expect too much on either the European or the American side. On the latter, in particular, the Marshall proposals, logically, call for the re-introduction of price controls and a measure of planning. Both are anathema to American business. History has shown only too often that its progress requires the lesson of catastrophe. One would be delighted to be proved wrong, in this instance.

In any case, the proposals cannot finally solve the problem of the U.S. balance of payments. Once Europe is reconstructed, American supplies, welcome today, will become "imported unemployment" for their beneficiaries. The aid-to-Europe programme postpones the issue for a number of years. But in the end, only a redistribution of U.S. national income can produce the solution. No such redistribution is possible without profound social changes in the U.S., which its governing classes can be expected to resist to the limit of their power. These changes imply a vast increase in the incomes of the poorer classes enabling them to absorb not only the largest possible share of the national product, but also a much larger volume than previously of imports. They also imply a reduction in working hours to slow down the rate of growth of the national income. In the end, the United States must, on a far larger scale than Victorian and Edwardian England, become the *rentier* of the world by accepting a large import surplus.

At Paris, on July 2, Mr. Molotov must have had in mind the Russian equivalent of "*timeo Americanos et dona ferentes*". But the fear of the Trojan

jeep cannot explain everything. In fact, if the Russian leaders are convinced that in the long run, whatever the transient tactical moves, Russia will have to fight American capitalism, then they should, logically, have accepted the gift, for equally tactical reasons. As there is no generosity in politics, so there is no gratitude. And the gifts of to-day might have helped to forge the weapons of to-morrow more quickly than Russian resources alone would permit. Such might have been the Russians' reaction had they felt that Mr. Marshall's inclusion of Russia in his proposals was genuine. But they apparently concluded that it was a manœuvre and that Mr. Marshall had only wanted to give the impression of swinging over to Mr. Wallace's policy because he knew anyway that Congress would have rejected a plan that included Russia. Russia, having prevented the participation of her satellites in the second Paris conference, would seem to feel stronger than some observers have recently tried to make out: either because she counts on a rapid weakening of America's position as a consequence of an approaching slump, or because of an improvement in her own position, or for both reasons. But in that case, the break between East and West has been consummated and July 2, 1947, the date of the breakdown in Paris, may in relation to the future, come to assume the same importance as March 7, 1936, the date of the occupation of the Rhineland, in relation to the events of 1939.

R. P. SCHWARZ.

III. AMERICA'S ATTITUDE

In the critical summer of 1940 it was a matter for grave and extended argument amongst Americans, engaged in awakening their fellow-countrymen to the need for resistance to Hitler, in what terms to depict the plight and peril of Europe. Was the case for aiding the Allies to be argued on the basis that Europe's need was desperate, that without American aid the continent would collapse? Or was it better to depict the remaining democracies of Europe as going concerns, national incarnations of Emersonian self-reliance, needing only as much as America could spare of her super-abundance to tip the scales in the direction of victory? The first line of argument invited and received the rejoinder that a continent so water-logged was bound to sink anyway, and American hands had better be kept at home to man the pumps of the western hemisphere which no doubt was the next target for the aggressors' design. The second contention lay open to the objection that it seemed to under-play the urgency of the moment, to invite a continuation of too little and too late, to encourage the hope that America could after all be saved by Europe's exertions. In the event, circumstances resolved the dilemma. As the Hitlerian knife went through the continental butter the beauties of self-reliance faded like autumn leaves. But equally the Battle of Britain disposed, with temporary finality, of the contention that because much is lost all is derelict. There then emerged,

in the twelve months before Pearl Harbour, a pattern of American aid based on a recognition that Europe's needs were crucial, but her plight by no means hopeless, and finding expression in the compromise of Lend-Lease and other methods 'short of war.'

Ever since VE Day the same dilemma has haunted the council chambers and the policy conferences of Washington. For a while, in the after-glow of San Francisco, it was hoped that the United Nations would resolve it, by setting Europe in the new context of a world organization. It was in this supra-European setting that UNRRA was maintained, the Anglo-American financial agreements, set in the world pattern of Bretton Woods, were passed, and the Byrnes experiments in getting along with Russia were conducted.

But the "one world" solvent proved inadequate. The European flint remained hard and intractable. It was in Europe that American-Russian co-operation proved most difficult, in Europe that displaced and starving persons persisted to harrow the American conscience, in Europe that Yugoslav aircraft shot down American pilots, in Europe that Communism conducted its most shameless variations on the themes of Nazi means for Marxist ends.

Forced back on its dilemma the American administration has grasped each horn in turn. The reconstruction loan to Western Europe, the post-UNRRA relief appropriation have alike posited a European economy strong enough to keep itself alive once the initial pump-priming has been administered. On the other hand the tone, if not the substance, of the Greco-Turkish Aid Bill presupposed an imminent peril, a plight so desperate that nothing but immediate and strong action could avert disaster. Merely to persist in either of these tactics is, however, scarcely possible any longer. The pump-priming has patently failed: the European bilges are filling faster than American aid can empty them. Moreover the major premise of Europe's fundamental soundness no longer rings convincingly in any American ear; the Battle of Britain whose victory in 1940 lent credence to the optimist has turned in 1947 to the admitted defeat which Mr. Herbert Morrison announced to the House of Commons on July 8. But if European self-reliance is exposed as a sham, so also the invocation of the European death-rattle, as over Greece and Turkey, is a dangerous appeal to repeat. For one thing it lies too uncomfortably near to the truth, evoking the never-to-be-quite-stilled American suspicion that the only permanently satisfactory European continent is the lost Atlantis, and that American efforts to keep the land mass above water are only delaying actions against the inevitable (and because inevitable, proper) action of Time and Providence. For another, it is a cry which, to be effective, must not be repeated too often: to save a drowning man once is all very well, to rescue a continuous succession of victims imposes a burden at which a mere bystander, however able-bodied, is entitled to demur. Worst of all, perhaps, it may tend to falsify the facts of the situation. In 1947 the Europe to be saved is not, as in 1940, a succession of nation-states threatened by aggression from without; now the

menace is from within, in physical decrepitude, in industrial and agricultural disorganization, in loss of heart and, in some cases, of skill.

For all these reasons the novelty of the Marshall offer is to be welcomed. It avoids each horn of the dilemma. Accepting the European sickness, it does not assume either that the patient is incurable or that the American physician can by his own mere endeavours effect a cure. It calls upon Europe first to prove its own vitality, by an effort which it alone can make. Then, and not until then, it argues, will American medicines be effective. However well or ill such an approach reflects the facts of a diseased Europe, there can be no doubt that it is excellently attuned to the psychosis of post-war America. The United States at the moment has reached a stage of peculiar difficulty and uncertainty in relation to Europe. She has invested big sums in the relief and rehabilitation of this continent. In the words of Mr. Marshall: "Since the termination of the war, American goods in the amount of some 82,000,000 tons valued at over 9,000,000,000 dollars, have flowed into Europe from this country." On this gigantic investment there has been so far virtually no return. The investor has now to make a critical decision. Is he to stop, cut his losses and pull out? The idea is almost impossible—though not quite as impossible to a Kansas taxpayer as to a Labour Party delegate confidently complaining about dollar diplomacy. More feasibly, is he to continue the present palliatives, by no means small in terms of the American budget, but too little in terms of the imbalance of trans-Atlantic economies to be anything but a gigantic Speenhamland for Western Europe? To do so might be just sufficient to keep the commercial wolf from the door without over-harassing the American taxpayer in a year in which he chooses his presidential and congressional rulers at the polls. But it promises no positive return, and it adds, at the meanest calculation, a sizable sum to the budget. Does the investor then take his courage in both hands and go forward, in Mr. Morrison's words, and devise "some means whereby billions of dollars' worth of North and South American production could be transferred across the Atlantic without the necessity for immediate payment in the form of an equal and opposite flow of European goods"? (The investor, of course, well knows that "North and South American" necessarily means "principally United States" and that "immediate" is under-statement for "within measurable time.")

If the investor is to do this he must, being American, seek assurance on at least three points. First of all he will need to be convinced that he is not throwing good money after bad. He will demand that the European watertight national economies be opened to admit a reasonable flow of intra-European as well as extra-European trade. If it be complained that such demands come ill from the homeland of Senator Smoot and Congressman Hawley it will be replied on a point of fact that both these gentlemen are dead and on a point of principle that to find an American equivalent of European tariffs you would have to suppose that Illinois and Pennsylvania were empowered to ex-

clude each other's steel or that New York, Connecticut and Massachusetts had only just succeeded in effecting an experimental customs union. Almost ninety years ago Lincoln regarded it as axiomatic for the American union that there was "no line, straight or crooked, suitable for a national boundary, upon which to divide" and even before his time Americans had marvelled at a Europe which would find so many crooked boundaries for its national constituents. If the United States could merge its internal sovereignties after only one civil war, is it too much to ask of Europe, says the average American, to move in the same direction after two? Upon the answer to his question depends to an enormous degree the backing which he will give to the Marshall Plan. His conviction is deep-rooted that if Europe is as sick as his newspapers and his government and the size of his national debt tell him she is, then the root of the malady is to be found in the cancerous growths of her nationalism. Consequently he demands, as the first evidence that the patient is curable at all, that she take what steps are in her power to cut away these strangleholds upon her economy and her society.

Secondly, the average American needs to be convinced that he is not being "played for a sucker". He knows the plight of Europe is desperate, but he is not so sure that the governments of Europe who are the channels for his investment are not going to divert it to ends of their own and leave him, poor credulous fool, a victim of his own charity and their artifice. Americans old enough to remember the 1914-1918 war are also old enough to remember the war debts and the 'Shylock' cartoons; Americans who can only remember the 1939-1945 war are not without equally powerful, and far more recent recollections—of Russian non-recognition of Lend-Lease, of allegations that dollar diplomacy animated American payments to UNRRA, of British politicians protesting against the negotiation of the American loan and the same politicians urging its repudiation, when obtained. It is of little importance that to all these controversies there are two sides and that there are other generositys besides those of Spam and dollars—of little importance because in the immediate situation it is still the same side to whom Europe looks for assistance, and still Spam and dollars in which she wishes American generosity to express itself. No doubt a nation long schooled in the arts of world government, confident of itself and sharp-set on its objectives would care little what reaction its subsidies provoked provided they produced the concrete results at which it aimed. But the United States is no such nation—nor could be, without becoming imperialist to an extent which even its critics never imagine. To a degree which interferes with its own best interests it is sensitive to what is said and thought about it, sensitive above all to being led up the garden path by cynical confidence men. To rebuff its overtures is consequently not difficult. Marshal Tito has learnt the art to perfection. Mr. Will Lawther is a brave apprentice, welcoming the Marshall plan in one paragraph of his speech to the National Union of Mine-

workers, but sternly warning in the second: "This nation will not sacrifice all it did to defeat Hitler to sit at the foot of some new financial oligarchy." It will take a close student of Mr. John L. Lewis's bargaining style to make such *finesse* intelligible in the United States.

Lastly, of course, our American investor is going to ask himself what the effect of Communism is going to be on his investment, and of his investment on Communism. There is no doubt that he feels relieved that Russian manœuvring, Russian legalism, Russian obstruction will not be represented in person at the European councils which will handle any system of aid which develops from the Marshall offer. His relief will undoubtedly be reflected in a greater willingness by Congress to vote funds without crippling safeguards or restrictions. But he knows that no dollar curtain will keep Russia out of Europe. He knows that without the co-operation of Eastern Europe and the Russian zones of Germany and Austria the plan's difficulties are increased and its chances of success diminished. He knows too that Russian influence oversteps national boundaries and that the communists of many lands can be relied upon to unite in submissive obedience to orders from the Kremlin. All this, if other conditions are encouraging, will not prevent him from going forward with the offer, but his enthusiasm for it and the freedom which he will allow to European spenders of American dollars will necessarily be dependent on his conviction that it is being harnessed to a constructive democratic purpose. No doubt he will prefer that that democratic purpose was expressed in terms of a *laissez-faire* as nearly pure as its extremely *un-laissez-faire* pump-priming would permit, but it will be contrary to two profound American impulses—the impulse to self-determination and the impulse to world peace—if he insists on such an interpretation as a pre-condition of his aid. If Europe, or Britain, or our back-bench Marxists on either side of the House of Commons, are still worried that he will, one can only say *solvebitur ambulando*—but at a good, brisk, business-like pace, not in a goose step or a funeral march.

H. G. NICHOLAS.

THE FUTURE OF THE INDIAN STATES

BY SIRDAR IKBAL ALI SHAH

WHEREAS most people feel relieved that at last the major problems of Indian politics are solved by partition, it is understood that no lasting settlement can occur unless the position of the Indian Princes is definitely knitted into the Indian polity of tomorrow. Anxiety persists, however, at the contradictory nature of two statements, the one made by the late Duke of Connaught, representing the King, in February, 1921, at a Delhi durbar and the other by Mr. Attlee during the second reading of the India Independence Bill. The Duke proclaimed on behalf of the King-Emperor: "The assurances given on many occasions by my Royal predecessors and myself, ever to maintain unimpaired the privileges, rights and dignities of the Princes of India," and added, "the Princes may rest assured that this pledge remains inviolate and inviolable." Mr. Attlee said: "If I were asked what would be the attitude of His Majesty's Government to any State which has decided to cut adrift from its neighbours and assert its independence, I would say to the Ruler of that State, 'take your time, and think again.'"

It will be noted that several considerations arise out of these statements. First, the political contact of Great Britain with the Indian princes for the last two centuries and a quarter, has left no doubt that explicitly binding engagements exist between this country and the Indian States. Secondly, such engagements cannot be declared null and void unilaterally. Thirdly, only a few years ago an express undertaking was given by this country to the Princes that the transfer of paramountcy would not be undertaken without the consent and the knowledge of the Indian States. All these commitments are said to have been broken by the decision of His Majesty's Government through their recent declaration of not only removing paramountcy, but also by discouraging any States to seek the renewal of their political contact, either with the British Government or the Crown. The significance of this question cannot be fully comprehended without first considering what these Indian States are, their relative physical and moral importance, their value in Indian or Pakistan federation and their desire to remain completely independent and sovereign.

There are 562 Indian States, covering a combined area four times that of France with a population of nearly 94,000,000: Hyderabad alone is the size of Italy. They are generally divided into four groups: the Rajputana group, in existence before the Mogul Empire; a second group brought into being by nobles during the Mogul period, such as the Dominions of the Nizam of

Hyderabad; a third section emerging in the period of the decline of the Mogul power, as a result of the Mahratta Confederacy, and a fourth, the newer States such as Kashmir, which were set up at the advent of the British in India.

The policy of the East India Company towards these groups, collectively and individually, was one of non-intervention in their internal and external affairs. All the agreements, signed between their representatives and those of the East India Company, reveal that the Indian States were on an equal footing with the growing power of the Company, and little suggestion of subordination was apparent. After the transference of the Company's prerogative to the British Crown in 1857, Queen Victoria pledged herself to maintain the treaties and engagements concluded by the Company with the States; and in appointing Lord Canning as Governor-General, the Queen used the expression: "Our first Viceroy and Governor-General". This phrase was understood by the Princes to mean that they were in direct treaty relations with the person who occupied the British Throne, a position which was, perhaps, emphasized by the East India Company, when it undertook to respect the rights and privileges of the Indian States. In return it expected the States to have no intercourse with one another, and to remain strictly isolated in matters of policy, local or foreign.

The same position was maintained up to the beginning of the twentieth century; and whereas during the Company's period of governance, the question of paramountcy was neither broached nor definitely exercised, it was Lord Curzon who said in 1903, at Bhawalpur: "The sovereignty of the Crown is everywhere unchallenged; it has itself laid down the limitation of its own prerogative." In pursuance of this departure from the Company's policy, by the representative of the Crown in India, many examples can be cited to show that the Crown's representative could, and in fact did, interfere in the local affairs of the Indian States, directly or through the Political Department of the Government of India. Matters were left to drift in this form until the outbreak of the 1914-1918 war, when the Princes gave wholehearted support to the Imperial cause, and by virtue of the Act of 1919, there was an urge on the part of the Indian Princes to have their position clarified on the control of the paramount Power, and on the point that as they were no longer isolated islands in the body politic of India they were henceforth expected to act as a corporate body of the Chamber of Princes.

During the next seven years in India there was intense political agitation, in which the peoples of the Indian States were also deeply interested. In tune with their fellow-countrymen in British India, the subjects of the Princes demanded a share in the administration of their homeland. The peculiar point to note here is that, through an unwritten law, the British and the States spokesmen undertook not to interfere with each other's territory in any political sense, and therefore when the nationalist spirit surged high in British India, the rulers of the States, generally speaking, because they discouraged the invasion of British Indian ideals into their several territories were styled by

their countrymen in British India as anti-Indian reactionaries. In point of fact, the rulers were conforming to their engagement with the British Government, in return for the so-called moral and material protection which the British had promised to them; as evinced by the many edicts passed in British India in favour of the Indian Princes.

In any case, the time had arrived when a clear-cut definition had to be found of the nature and extent of paramountcy, in its conception and application, over the States. Lord Reading's notorious letter to the Nizam of Hyderabad in 1926, over the question of Berar, had brought the whole issue to the forefront: "The right of the British Government to intervene in the internal affairs of the Indian States is another instance of the consequences necessarily involved in the supremacy of the British Crown" Under the chairmanship of Sir Harcourt Butler in 1928, an Indian States Committee was therefore set up to investigate the precise limits of the paramount Power. Excellent though its Report was, it failed to give any definite ruling on the point for the purpose of which it was avowedly appointed, so that the matter remained where it was.

By now, both in British India and the Indian States, there was political disquietude; and when, as the result of the Indian Act of 1935, federation was sought from the Indian States, the natural reaction of the rulers was to go back to their original demands. Finally, they did not come into the federation scheme until war started in 1939. True to their traditional engagement and putting aside the contest, the Indian States, big and small, threw their weight into the successful prosecution of the war.

Their services were as illustrious during this last war as they were during the previous one. His Highness the Jam Sahib of Nawanagar, the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, rose in the Chamber at the outbreak of war to move a resolution of loyalty and resolute devotion: "The Chamber of Princes requests His Excellency the Crown Representative kindly to place before His Imperial Majesty the King-Emperor the firm determination of the Ruling Princes and Chiefs of India to render every possible assistance in men, money and material to His Imperial Majesty and his Government in their heroic struggle for upholding the cause of justice and maintaining the sacredness of treaties and covenants" The testimony proudly published in the official documents of the Chamber of Indian Princes, covers fifty-six pages in its most condensed form, of help in men, material and money, and is a worthy monument of that attachment to their friends which 560 Maharajas and Nawabs of India nobly vindicated in the name of India.

Since the conclusion of the war many political comings and goings have occurred between this country and India, the outlines of which need no recapitulation, up to the latest phase of the Indian question, so happily solved barely a few weeks ago. And now the Indian Princes are faced, not with a dilemma, as some would regard it, but with the adoption of a clear policy

either of joining one or the other Dominion, that is, India or Pakistan, or of standing alone on their sovereign rights as a result of the removal of paramountcy. The scattered groups of the Indian States of Kathiawar and Gujarat resolved in June to form a confederation for the purpose of entering the Indian Union. Similarly, another group, led by the Maharaja of Nawanagar, decided only recently to form another confederation, called the "Union of Rajasthan"—in which the presidium will be the Executive of the Federation, to be advised by four members. The last named, like the Confederation of Kathiawar, in Western India, has in view the association of the people of their States in the venture; so that, preserving a monarchical form of Government, it may join the Union of India, as a democratic body, under the leadership of the Maharana of Udaipur. With the dismemberment of the Chamber of Princes, following the recent controversy in India, it is a happy augury for the future of Princely India that this grouping is taking place, because three hundred and twenty-seven nobles and chieftains, who formerly had no representation in the Chamber, now have that opportunity through the medium of this grouping. The States in the northern Punjab and in the United Provinces, along with the other groups already mentioned, when making an approach for federation with the Indian Union, may be confronted with uncomfortable problems; the Indian Congress may require them to surrender, according to Mr. Patel, the important sovereign rights of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications. Those States which may surrender these rights, would perhaps require an assurance that the Indian Union would not make the mistake, as did the British Indian Government from time to time, of interfering in the domestic affairs of the Princes and their States.

In the nature of things, the Indian States must federate, either individually or in groups, in their own interest and in the interest of India, with the Indian Union or Pakistan. This dictum, however, does not apply to those who may wish to remain independent of these attachments; for instance, Kashmir, Bhopal, Travancore and Hyderabad. Each one of these appears to have full justification for remaining outside and choosing its own course. The question of Hyderabad provides a test case, and to examine it minutely is to understand one of the fundamental principles which should guide the Indian politics of tomorrow.

Hyderabad, the premier State of India, occupies an area in the Deccan the size of England and Scotland together; its population is sixteen millions—two and a half times that of Canada—and its Nizam, Mir Osman Ali Khan, has formally declared his State's independence, to date from the British withdrawal on August 15. The present dynasty is descended from Asaf Jah, a famous ruler of the time of the Mogul Empire. This noble was called the "kingmaker", due to his power and great influence at Delhi; and when the Mogul Empire ceased to exist, the Nizam, as Viceroy of the Deccan, became an independent potentate. This independent status of the Nizam, at the time of

the British advent in India, has been acknowledged in numerous treaties made between successive Nizams and the East India Company, and later with the British Crown direct. In the seventh treaty, for example, in support of the idea of Hyderabad's independence, we find the following passage: "The three contracting parties having agreed to enter into the present war, should their arms be crowned with success in the joint prosecution of it, an equal division shall be made of the territory, forts, and whatever Government may become possessed of from the time of each party commencing hostilities." When Queen Victoria took over the engagements of the East India Company *en bloc* she agreed to respect all these treaties, and thus this particular one, with others respecting the independent status of the Nizam, still stands. It is on record too, that Lord Hastings in 1818, urged both the Nawab-Wazir of Oudh and the Nizam of Hyderabad openly to assume the title of kings of their own territories; a step which the Nizam at that time did not consider necessary. In consideration of these and other treaties international lawyers and historians support Hyderabad's right to maintain independent sovereignty. Another relic of history also serves to remind the people of the State of their traditional freedom. On the 19th of June each year is celebrated the anniversary of Hyderabad's Independence, dating from 1712, the time of Asaf Jah. It is interesting to note in this connection that in the official publication of the Chamber of Princes, the British Agent at Hyderabad is mentioned as "presenting his credentials" to the Nizam: a procedure well known as applying between sovereign States. In July 1789, another important treaty in the constitutional history of Hyderabad was signed by Earl Cornwallis, in which he recognized the State's right to conduct external affairs with neighbours: "I agree that in future either party, without a breach of treaty shall be at liberty to receive and send vakeels (emissaries) to correspond with any powers in the Deccan in such manner as may be expedient for the benefit of their own affairs."

In the contemporary sphere, the Nizam's position rests partly, too, on certain sovereign powers vested in him by usage and tradition; in the words of Professor Panikkar: "The recognized outward symbols of sovereignty, such as the right to give titles, to have coins and stamps (of their own), to be inviolable and above law, to have the authority to promulgate legislation which commands unquestioned obedience, the major Indian States possess and are guaranteed in their possession by treaties. They give titles of honour and distinction to their subjects. The Nizam gives the title of Maharaja, Rajah, Nawab, and all the rest of the recognized Indian titles of honour."

Briefly, then, the Nizam's right to independence for his Dominions may be said to rest on the documentary evidence in which such freedom is explicitly accepted; upon letters and pronouncements; and upon rights which are universally accepted as those of sovereign States, such as those of coinage, judiciary, and the right to bestow titles. Then there is the less tangible, but none the

less operative, historical evidence of usage; the people's recognition of the omnipotence of the Nizam, for example, and the innumerable other aspects so admirably described by Professor Westlake in his comments on the relationship of the ruler with the paramount Power, as a living, growing relationship, shaped by circumstance and policy, in a mixture of history, theory and modern fact. The future programme of these States which have chosen to retain their independence will probably be very similar to that of Hyderabad. In the words of the Nizam in his latest pronouncement: "The result in Law of the departure of the paramount Power in the near future will be that I shall become entitled to resume the status of an independent sovereign. But the question of the nature and extent of the association or relationship between my State and the units in British India remains for decision at a latter stage, when their constitutions and powers have been determined. Whatever form of constitution they ultimately adopt, it will be the desire of Hyderabad to live in the closest friendship and amity with both." It may also be added that the thorny question of the ownership of Berar is now happily adjusted, for although the Act of 1935 had recognized the Nizam's sovereignty over Berar, the effect of Clause (I) (b) of the recent Indian Independence Bill makes the Nizam's ownership of that part of India actual.

One thing, however, is certain from the repeated assertions of the Nizam. When the State regains her complete sovereignty, she will remain in the British Commonwealth as a Dominion, and has affirmed her determination to stand by all the existing treaties with Britain. The British Government, having declared through the India Act that all treaties between this country and the States will automatically lapse upon the establishment of India and Pakistan as Dominions, thereby proposes to denounce unilaterally her treaties with these States. Hyderabad thus would have no alternative but to maintain its independent status and arrange fresh treaties based on an alliance with Great Britain, as well as with the other Governments being set up in British India.

More or less on similar grounds Travancore could also justify her independence, in addition to the fact of her Dewan's recent fear of the rapid progress of communist influence there and his refusal to entertain any diplomatic association with the Soviet Union, which Mr. Nehru's government enjoys at the moment. Without careful consideration of the attitude of these major Indian States, the plethora of ills in India cannot be said to have been finally cured.

SPAIN REVISITED (I)

BY A. F. WILLS

SPAIN has ever been a land about which it is extraordinarily hard to generalize. And when one has been absent from it for over ten years, with little opportunity during most of that time for following the course of events, the sudden plunge back into the Iberian atmosphere of harsh contrasts both material and spiritual is bound at first to be disconcerting. Soon, however, one begins to piece together the patch-work quilt, which remains a true symbol of the country from every point of view.

One need not be in the country more than a few days before noticing a certain feeling of isolation from the rest of the world—a feeling intensified in the consciousness, no doubt, by the interruption of direct communications with France. Foreign newspapers and books are scarce and expensive, and one is at once exposed to the full blasts of nation-wide propaganda. Occasionally a leading article may appear in a paper like the Monarchist *A.B.C.* which can, without too much strain, be understood as implied criticism—though in very general terms. Recently, for instance, this paper was fairly outspoken on the subject of the draft Law of Succession, the text of which was broadcast by General Franco on March 31, and, for a day or two after, a shadowy sort of sparring match took place between it and the party organ *Arriba*, seasoned with an ironic courtesy on the part of the former which could not fail to raise a few smiles. However, it is doubtful if even so much as this could have happened without official approval. The authorities make out that the control exercised is "preventive" rather than "coercive" but, at all events, the printed word remains largely the controlled word, except for the clandestine publications on single sheets of paper whose negative message produces its own type of frustration.

The sensation of control exercised in the interests of "public order" is not felt particularly strongly anywhere. In the capital, however, and in large cities like Barcelona, a strict, continuous though discreet, "surveillance" is maintained over possible "foci of infection", the general public being left to its own devices. Certainly, in cafés, bars and such places tongues appear to be no whit less busy "*echando pestes*"—showering abuse—on the Government as ever they were under a non-authoritarian one. Yet a foreigner cannot but notice the greater reserve displayed by most people to whom he is casually introduced. For the rest, people's movements are watched and travel permits have to be obtained to go from place to place. But for the foreigner there is

complete freedom to move around, subject only to normal police control.

Meanwhile, habeas corpus—or anything of that nature—simply does not exist. It is this which, above all, makes the régime unpalatable, if not detestable, to many of the intelligentsia. For justice in the courts is arbitrary. One is at the mercy of the police, while one's past history may be interpreted in such a way as to supply a plausible reason for depriving one of one's living and rightful professional status. In such circumstances, personal integrity counts for nothing against the petty vindictiveness of some minor official. One feels alone, bereft of the normal moral support which an unbiassed civil authority automatically provides. Small wonder, then, that the more sensitive find this atmosphere "*irrespirable*"—unbreathable.

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that most Spaniards resent, or are even more than vaguely aware of, these restrictions on personal liberty. The Spaniard is not nearly so concerned with publishing his disagreement with the "state of affairs" as is the Englishman: it largely suffices him if he frequents a reliable coterie in whose ears he can pour out the vials of his pent-up wrath. Nor has he been accustomed to the rule of an impeccable, or near-impeccable, justice, to which the police forces have to bow the knee just like any ordinary citizen. Liberty, for him, is based far more on a sense of individual worth vis-à-vis other men than on the public expression of individual opinion or the enjoyment of individual political rights. In would seem, in fact, that, provided the material wants of daily existence are adequately assured, the ordinary Spaniard is not disinclined to accept an authoritarian government with something very nearly approaching a sigh of relief—relief in the sense that now there's nothing which he personally can do about it; so heigh-ho! let's get on with our own more important occupations—football, bull-fighting and the like, and leave the self-constituted authorities to manage those troublesome public affairs as best they can! Thus, after the nightmare of the Civil War, all the more reason why the present Government should be accepted, if not welcomed, as a bulwark against the recurrence of strife. Furthermore, the Spaniard's interest in party politics is not easily maintained, unless there happens to be some fairly immediate prospect of his particular "fancy" occupying the seat of power.

On the other hand, great reserves of devotion can be called upon when the opportunity is presented to express in action a common ideal for man in general, though involving—as it invariably seems to do—the suppression or expulsion of minorities unwilling to share in that ideal. The true Spanish approach to life's problems thus remains to-day, as it was in the sixteenth century, essentially a religious—or integrating—as opposed to a political—or opportunist—approach, however disguised in sheer opportunism it may at times appear, now as in the past. Brutality has marked this present régime—as it has marked outwardly similar ones in other countries—with a dark and sinister stain. But with all the harsh treatment meted out to dissident minorities, it still

remains true that in the course of the Civil War an ideal of social justice was painfully elaborated; that this ideal has since been staunchly upheld by General Franco and subordinates most concerned, and practical results obtained from the pursuit of it.

The guiding principle behind the National-Syndicalist movement led by the late José-Antonio Primo de Rivera, elder son of the dictator, may be roughly described as the humanizing of the relations between employer and employed, so that labour ceased to be regarded simply as a commodity which the employee offered for sale and the employer bought from him. Instead, what was offered and what was bought was the product of labour or, alternatively, the workman's service, and this gave back to labour its natural dignity, placing it above the hazards of an employer's irresponsibility towards his employees. It is around this fundamental principle of the dignity of labour—so forcefully enunciated in the famous encyclical of Leo XIII—that the social services under the present Government have been built.

The social services are many and varied. It is enough to say that compulsory insurance covers injury, sickness contracted in the exercise of one's profession, health and maternity, family allowances and old age pensions, the ratio of contribution as between employer and employed varying according to the particular service. The number of wage-earners insured under this scheme is nearly six and a quarter million out of a total working population (inclusive of all professions and trades) of 8,500,000, and up to June 30, 1946, benefits spread over the previous eight years and amounting to 5,300 million pesetas were paid out. It is worth noting that of this latter total 3,425 million pesetas, or say approximately two-thirds, represents payments made under family allowances to something over 3,250,000 beneficiaries, the number of insured persons at that date being around two and a half million. The general purpose of family allowances is to furnish wage-earners with financial assistance in proportion to the number of persons for whom they have to provide, special provision being made for agricultural labourers, widows and orphans, marriage loans and birth premiums. Contributions amount to six per cent. of salary; five per cent. being paid by the employer and one per cent. by the employee. What it amounts to is that a tax is levied on industry—in its widest sense—to ensure national support for the wage-earning family, the implication being that a nation's truest asset is its people.

Housing and land settlement are two other practical problems which have, in the main, been energetically tackled from the National-Syndicalist angle. At the end of the Civil War, Spain was left with over 80,000 new houses to build and a serious lack of locally-produced materials for building them. The supply of local materials is still far from satisfying the demand; but all industries auxiliary to the building trade have been specially encouraged with the result that the production of cement, for example, is now over three million tons per annum. Building activities ranging from miners' homes in Asturias (where 5,000 new houses have solved the shortage) to university cities and from

rural homesteads to dams and reservoirs indicate a forward-looking policy.

The government department chiefly concerned with the building or rebuilding of homes is the *Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda*, created in April 1939. It has the enviable reputation of working, not against, but in co-operation with, the different local authorities, and is now well on the way towards the completion of its original programme. But it is not the only public body engaged in reconstruction work. There is also the *Dirección General de Regiones Devastadas* whose job is to rebuild not just houses but whole towns and villages, such as Brunete, which was completed towards the end of 1945. At the end of December 1946 it had nearly 16,500 new or rebuilt homes to its credit, in addition to numerous schools and public buildings of all kinds, including 150 parish churches, while a further 700 public buildings had been rebuilt out of funds administered by the organization. With a nation-wide reconstruction scheme of this sort, centralized in Madrid, there has been obviously a certain amount of wastage and overlapping. But the municipalities of these shattered towns and villages could never, of their own accord, have raised the necessary funds for rebuilding. Furthermore, there were the distinct advantages, obtained by this centralization, of the most up-to-date building devices that could be employed, the first-class architectural talent that could be engaged and that local authorities and other public bodies less directly concerned could be easily and naturally associated with the scheme.

It is sometimes pointed out that reconstruction work in Spain has been slow; that more use could have been made of prefabricated houses; that the great thing is to get a roof over peoples' heads, irrespective of what the roof looks like or how long it may last. It should be remembered, however, that, quite apart from the supply difficulties already referred to, Spain is still predominantly an agricultural country, which means that in very many cases building a house means building the right sort of a house, with maybe a walled-in yard and outhouses for domestic animals into the bargain. Certainly, the housing shortage in Madrid is acute, and, on the face of it, far more use of cheap, temporary constructions might have been made there. But only the west and south-west outskirts of the city were severely damaged, and the shortage is the direct result of an increase of over half in the population since the Civil War.

The drift to the towns is proceeding in Spain as in other countries, and with more reason perhaps than in most, for conditions in some of the rural districts, especially of the south and south-west are still very bad. This is an old legacy for which the present Government is no more responsible than was the Republican government before it. Each, in turn, has adopted a scheme for settling the landless on the land, and, to a certain extent, the present Government has taken up the task where the previous one left off. But whereas, under the Republic, the colonist was envisaged as the eventual proprietor of his piece of land at some remote and unspecified date, remaining until further notice a rent-payer to the State, under the present Government a definite target limit is

fixed by the end of which time he should be completely independent.

This changed attitude has a double effect. It encourages the colonist to take the job seriously in order to become a small proprietor within a reasonable time; while the State enters into a far closer, more personal, contractual relationship with the colonist. Thus its interest in him is not merely economic but formative; that is, it is not just concerned with his livelihood and means of repaying the loans and costs of farming materials provided; but also with his development as a social being, fitting him for responsible ownership through education, medical services and whatever may aid him to rise to a superior human level. Normally, the colonist passes, after a five years' probationary period, to the position of potential owner, becoming absolute owner at the end of a further period of twenty years, by which time it is estimated he will have paid back in easy stages, either in money or in kind, the value of the advances made to him. But there is no hard-and-fast rule. The system is sufficiently flexible to allow for unforeseen circumstances and individual treatment of each case.

The chief zones affected by this scheme are in Lower Aragon, Murcia and along the lower reaches of the Guadalquivir. Altogether there are fourteen zones actually in course of development, of which thirteen are on the basis of irrigation. Up to the end of last year some 20,000 families had thus been settled or re-settled on the land, an average of 4,000 families a year since 1942 when the government department concerned—*Instituto de Colonizacion*—first began to be effective. I have made an extensive tour of the Guadalquivir region, with the special object of studying the working of this land-settlement scheme there. Much remains to be done; but what has been accomplished is truly remarkable. From miserable huts thatched with dry grass to solid, four-roomed homes with kitchen and w.c., yard and stabling, kitchen garden and four and a half hectares of good, irrigated land, with church, school and clinic all within easy reach—such is the measure of difference! Many of the colonists in this area were composed of those who had already begun to be placed there under the *Reforma Agraria* in the time of the Republic. The remainder had been selected by the *Instituto* and mostly came from neighbouring towns whence they had drifted, originally, in search of work.

These projects, designed to raise the standard of living of the humblest, go hand-in-hand with an ambitious plan for supplying the entire country with cheap electricity. U.N.E.S.A.—the Electricity Co-ordinating Board—controls about eight-five per cent. of national production. The supply of electricity has doubled since 1939 and the present year should see an increase of 600 million kilowatts' worth of new energy available. The engineers estimate that if there is no interference with the present rate of progress, Spain should, within a relatively short time, be freed from the burden of importing fuel. Spain must become progressively industrialized if she is to maintain her population which increases at the rate of one million every four years.

The rise in the cost of living has, unfortunately, reduced—at any rate for the present—the net advantage it was calculated that the mass of people would derive from the measures of social reform already outlined. Sr. Girón de Velasco, Minister of Labour, has more than once in his speeches regretted that prices were continually outstripping all attempts at a fairer distribution of purchasing power. There have recently, however, been slight indications that prices were beginning to fall. Should this tendency persist, thanks to sufficient harvests, steady advances in industrial production and, not least, the new trade agreement with the Argentine, present dissatisfaction with the régime among the poorer class in the large cities is bound to diminish.

Enough has been said, I think, about the Franco régime from the material angle to indicate why General Franco can reasonably expect to receive a fair measure of support from the Spanish working-class in addition to the strong backing upon which he has always been able to count among the middle-classes. Propaganda abroad has done its best, or its worst, to pour scorn upon the spontaneous and nation-wide manifestations of solidarity of December 9, 1946, after having contributed largely towards bringing these about; but facts will not be dislodged so easily. The régime has its bitter enemies of course, and they are by no means only to be found among Leftist groups. On the contrary, there are all the disgruntled big business elements whose wings have been clipped to a considerable extent and who long to have them grow again under the benign rays—so they imagine—of traditional Bourbon-Habsburg monarchy. There are also all those of genuine Liberal tendency who view with ill-concealed disgust the present closed system of education, the inordinate influence of the Church in that sphere, and the pathetic efforts of party-trained men to fill educational posts which, in the past, were occupied by men of the highest professional competence, many of whom are still abroad.

Thus, though the country is progressing materially, it is obvious that spiritually it has been put into reverse gear. It has been too easy for upstarts, jealous and bent only on their own material advancement, to invoke lack of orthodoxy or past "anti-Spanish activities" on the part of their professional superiors and so relegate them to subordinate positions, or keep them out of professional posts altogether. True, one or two great Spaniards and international figures, like José Ortega y Gasset and Gregorio Marañón have returned within recent years to carry on with their work, and have publicly declared themselves in favour of the present régime. But even they, with their prestige, were not immune—at any rate at first—from calumny and misrepresentation in the clerical press.

(Mr. Wills, who lived in Spain before the Civil War and has recently returned to that country, will discuss in the second part of his article, to be published in September, the spiritual and political atmosphere.)

WAR AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES

BY BEN S. MORRIS

AFTER the 1914-1918 war there was a growing public recognition of the contributions which could be made to the welfare of the community through the development of psychological services. Practical techniques for dealing with problems in education and industry rapidly became more widely available, and the help of medical psychology became increasingly sought for the alleviation of mental suffering. Parallel developments have already begun to take place since the conclusion of the 1939-1945 war. There are, however, many profound differences between the situation now and in the early 1920's. Not only is the scope of the psychological contribution seen to be very much wider than it was hitherto thought to be, but public awareness is at a much higher level.

This awareness is, however, double edged and it is necessary for psychologists to take their social responsibilities extremely seriously. There are many people who are still convinced, not only that what there is in psychology, which is not commonsense, is nonsense, but that it is dangerous nonsense, at that. The more general attitude, however, is that psychology is 'on trial' and there is a readiness to accept psychological help where this is felt to be practical and likely to lead to immediate results which may be regarded as beneficial. There is as yet little realization that psychology, like any other branch of science, needs to investigate its problems by properly validated methods of research, and that it cannot guarantee either immediate results or that the results themselves, when available, will be welcomed by all concerned. A story which is related of some work in the Army may be quoted in illustration of this latter point. Investigations showed that the supply of well qualified applicants for commissions was greatly increased when the rank and file of units were allowed to nominate for candidature those of their fellows whom they felt might make good officers. Candidates nominated in this way, of course, underwent the same selection procedure as those nominated by their C.O.'s in the normal manner. The story goes that in spite of this, the procedure was held to be rather too radical and the experiment was discontinued.

The official Report of psychological work in the Services* in the 1939-1945 war is concerned with summarizing methods and results from the many specialized fields in which psychologists and psychiatrists worked, and in making

* *The Work of Psychologists and Psychiatrists in the Services.* H.M. Stationery Office. 2s.

recommendations for the improvement and development of the work in the Services themselves. It demonstrates the extremely wide range of problems towards the solution of which psychological methods have been found capable of making a contribution. The contrast between the scope and volume of psychological work in the 1914-1918 war and that reported here is staggering. In 1914-1918 the assistance of the psychological sciences was sought to help in the solution of two main problems. These were selection and grading of recruits and the treatment of "shell shock" or "battle neuroses" cases. (The latter problem received more attention in the British Army and the former in the American.)

In the 1939-1945 war the services of psychological specialists were called upon in relation to a vastly wider range of problems. Beginning, on the one hand, with provisions for recommending the rejection of those mentally unfit for service, and for the treatment of psychological disturbances arising in Service life, and, on the other, with the selection and grading of recruits for allocation to different Service employments, psychological work rapidly expanded in its scope to cover—to take the more important examples—methods and conditions of training, the design of operational equipment, the selection of officers, the morale of fighting units, psychological warfare, the study of German prisoners of war and the resettlement of returning Service men.

Many of these problems required highly specialized training and research. There was work for almost every kind of psychological specialist, ranging from those with expert knowledge of the special senses, such as vision, to those whose work lay in the relief of mental suffering through psychotherapy. Moreover, the nature of Service requirements brought psychologists into contact with many novel problems. This was so not only in fields where concepts and techniques were already fairly well developed, for example, in methods and conditions of learning but also in fields in which there had previously been very little progress, as in social psychology and in particular the study of problems of leadership and group morale.

It is difficult to present a coherent picture of the highly varied pattern of work which developed. This is due both to the wide range and variety of the problems studied and to the fact that the scope of these studies varied very greatly between the three Services. Moreover, the picture is complicated by the different rôles assumed under different conditions by the various types of psychological specialist. Broadly speaking, non-medical psychologists were concerned with assessing educability and personality, with ascertaining the best conditions of learning, training and working methods and conditions, and with investigating the inter-relation between individuals and groups. Psychiatrists, that is, medical psychologists, were primarily concerned, like other medical officers, with maintaining health, but because of the growing awareness of the need for a mentally healthy community, the psychiatrist's traditional function of alienist tended to become subsidiary to his tasks in preventive

medicine. It was found in practice that the fields of work with which medical and non-medical psychologists were concerned were often identical and much of the most fruitful work came through the active collaboration of both these branches of the psychological profession. For example, in the three inter-related spheres of selection, training and morale, the clinical experience and techniques of the psychiatrists turned out to be the indispensable complement to the more exact scientific methods of non-medical psychologists.

The Report does not and could not be expected to deal fully with any particular line of work. Nor does it attempt to assess the general implications of the work it reports for the development of psychology in relation to the practical problems of human life. The main body of the work reported is of immediate interest only to specialists. It is probable that the most far-reaching implications of psychological work in the Services will be found, not in the extremely interesting but highly specialized developments in say physiological psychology or in clinical psychiatry itself, or even in the selection of personnel—that most popular topic—but rather in the developments in social psychology concerned with problems of leadership, of morale, and of inter-personal and inter-group relations. Some of the most important of this work was done after the completion of the evidence for this Report, but the more general implications of work already done do not seem to have been fully realized.

Perhaps the best known of these developments is officer selection in the Army. After Dunkirk the flow of volunteers for commissions from the ranks became dangerously inadequate in size and of very poor quality, as was shown by the high rejection rate at Officer Training Units. This situation was remedied by the introduction of psychological techniques of selection which were manifestly fair and careful and which were conducted in a social atmosphere in which the rigid barriers between commissioned and non-commissioned ranks were at least partly broken down. The essential feature of the new technique was not the special tests or interviews which were used but the active participation of military officers, psychological technicians and the candidates themselves in the common task of finding those most suitable to go forward for training as officers.

The effect of this development on the number and quality of candidates for commissions was quite startling. There was thus a major improvement in morale, which may well be claimed as the most important result of this work, quite apart from such scientific proof as was obtained, that the new methods did in fact select better officers than the old. What in fact happened was that the traditional and rigid class structure of the Army was broken down, resulting in a vast increase in 'social mobility' which was of the greatest benefit to the Army as a whole.

Another very important result was a complete change in the concept of leadership which emerged among those engaged in officer selection. Leader-

ship was clearly seen not to be some mysterious quality possessed by a few specially endowed individuals but rather to be a rôle conferred by a group on one or more of its members to enable the group to carry out its appointed tasks. Under experimental conditions it was found that, left to themselves, groups of men invariably throw up their leaders who, after being 'tested out' by the group were either confirmed in their function, or rejected and their place taken by others. The number of individuals who could successfully assume leadership in this way was found to be surprisingly large.

Again in attempting to make provision for repatriated prisoners of war the military authorities early became aware (chiefly owing to a pioneer investigation conducted by a psychiatrist) that these men presented a severe problem to themselves, to the Army, and to the civilian community. Most of us have some personal knowledge of the fact that repatriates on their return felt strange, dissatisfied, and out of place, and that their relatives, after the initial raptures of reunion had passed, were also affected by difficulties in resuming previous relationships. This problem was in essence solved through the creation of special communities, Civil Resettlement Units—for which repatriates could volunteer—which were half way houses between the prison camp on the one hand and normal Army and civilian life on the other.* The essential feature of these communities was that they were democratically organized to allow these men to work their own way through their problems, with guidance and help from military officers, civilian organizations and psychological technicians. It was this active participation of all concerned together with very great and real freedom of action that enabled many of these men, their relatives and their employers mutually to readjust their relations to each other. The psychological staff concerned with this work considered that the problem was essentially one of creating social conditions in which the tensions and barriers created between prisoners of war and their home communities could be dissipated and broken down, by participant responsibility.

The real significance of these undertakings lies in the fact that they illustrate an attempt to deal with the problem of mass human adjustment by scientific means. It is fairly obvious that the concepts and techniques developed have wide implications in the field of normal community life. Industrial morale and the planning of new communities are two examples which quickly spring to mind. Shrewd observers have already recorded their conviction, not only that production problems are often largely problems of morale and that industrial morale is generally far below what it might be, but that this is so, not primarily because of poor economic incentives, extremely important as these are, but because of tensions and barriers which exist between management and workers, even in the most benevolent industries. As a result, the workers

* Described in *The Serviceman Comes Home* by A. T. M. Wilson, Pilot Papers: 1946: I. Pilot Press.

feel, and rightly feel, that they are not really, that is, humanly participant in production, but only participant in terms of their labour value. These tensions are present even where Joint Production Committees exist and this phenomenon is clearly one which calls for investigation by scientific methods.

One other development begun in the Services and which is of prime importance may be noted. This was the investigation by Army psychiatrists and psychologists of the mentality of German prisoners. The results of this investigation clearly showed the way in which the Nazi outlook develops. Its roots were seen to lie deep in the social and family traditions of German life, which are highly conducive to the development of an authoritarian character—that is, a kind of personality which functions at its best only within a rigid hierarchical structure, where status, and the giving and receiving of orders, are the most important considerations, and which is the natural breeding ground of sadism and terror. This study lays bare the psychosociological determinants of German aggression. Before a complete explanation can be given of why this form of society should have developed to the limit in twentieth-century Germany, these psychological findings will have to be closely related to the economic and material facts of German history in its world setting.

The link between the three lines of investigation quoted may not be obvious at first sight. The key lies in the concepts of the 'authoritarian character' and the 'authoritarian institution'. Authoritarianism is not an exclusively German characteristic. Shorn of overt sadism and modified by benevolent attitudes and partially democratic procedures, the authoritarian way of life permeates to a greater or lesser extent all human societies which at present exist. An army, as we know it, even a so-called democratic one, is essentially an authoritarian structure. Officer Selection Boards and Civil Resettlement Units were, by contrast, in essence and within certain limits, participant democracies. This was the reason for their success in releasing tensions, breaking down barriers and so creating conditions which, in the one case allowed officer candidates spontaneously to reveal their true personalities, and, in the other, allowed repatriated prisoners of war and the home community to effect mutual re-adjustment.

Why these developments first took place in the Army is an interesting historical problem. It may be, in part, that the Army was the largest of the Services and thus presented the problems in their most pressing forms. It is certainly true that a partial explanation is to be found, again for historical reasons, in that psychiatrists and psychologists employed in the Army contained among them a large group of those whose interests lay in the fields of personality study and of psychotherapy. This group tended to approach the problems of Army life as a whole from a 'clinical' standpoint, that is to say, in much the same way as modern psychopathology regards the maladjustment of the individual—whether soldier or civilian—as due to stresses in his emotional

life, so they tended to view the broader problems of the Army in terms of tensions, largely unconscious, existing between individuals, between individuals and groups, and between groups. Very often these tensions were found to be related to authoritarian individuals and the authoritarian way of life. Since the experiments described aimed at releasing these tensions and restoring social 'health' this work has not inaptly come to be called 'social therapy'.

What are the limits of this 'social therapy' and to what problems may it be applied? It is now reported that UNESCO have adopted as a major research project an inquiry entitled "Tensions Affecting International Understanding", in which it is proposed to study and attempt to reduce inter-group tensions, at various levels of social organization. Is it perhaps to developments of this sort that mankind must look for its salvation?

The solution of the Service problems discussed here, was in essence simple—in practice extremely difficult. Officer Selection Boards and Civil Resettlement Units were created and had to survive in the face of very considerable opposition. Indeed, by far the most interesting and pressing problem for those social scientists interested in such work, is the diagnosis and treatment of the resistances which society itself displays in any attempt to deal with its problems along these lines. These resistances take forms which are strikingly familiar to the psychotherapist in his work with individuals. They resemble closely the resistances displayed by neurotic patients to any attempts to give them back their health. From this point of view, the social scientist who investigates these problems with a view to helping towards a solution finds himself in a position in which he is regarded with highly mixed feelings. He himself is a source of tension and problems: on the one hand, there is an attitude which asserts that these problems are psychological and need psychological help for their solution, and, on the other, an attitude of anxiety and hostility rooted in a deep-seated feeling that a solution will involve the sacrifice of values and privileges which are held to be indispensable to the happiness of those concerned.

Taking the widest view of the situation, it may be seen that while the 1939-1945 war produced, on the one hand, a demonstration—on a macroscopic scale—of the tremendous powers of self-destruction now in the hands of human society, on the other, it produced a demonstration, very much less dramatic and less convincing and only on a microscopic scale, that human knowledge and skill when applied to human problems are capable of understanding and of relieving, if not of eliminating, conditions which give rise to many of the anxieties and hostilities which bedevil human relationships.

As has so often been said, the resolution of the present crisis in human affairs is a matter of whether or not men can, quickly enough, gain an understanding and control of themselves and their relationships, commensurate with their understanding and control of physical nature. Dilemmas of this very general order are not unfamiliar to those who have undertaken a long-term

view of the history and development of human society. The development of the very conditions which seem to threaten the existence of a society is often accompanied by the development of methods for dealing with these threats. The two sets of factors are clearly part of the same complex process which is at work in the growth of human communities. In the past, particular civilizations have perished not simply because they contained within themselves the seeds of their own doom, but because they were unable to utilize the powers they also had within them to remedy the diseases from which they suffered.

The major issue facing mankind at the present time is whether the particular societies which make up industrial civilization will be able, in time to avert disaster, to utilize and develop such knowledge and skill in the handling of mass human problems as they have already gained. Small though this knowledge and skill is, in proportion to the issue, we may well ask whether hope is to be found anywhere else. It should by now be clear that no basic solution is possible through economics and politics in themselves, for it is precisely in these spheres that human conflicts are writ largest. An attempt must be made to discover what lies behind these forms of thought and action in terms of basic human needs and strivings. The minimum equipment needed for such an investigation would seem to be a combination of the values of humanism, and the methods of scientific inquiry, along with an attitude of genuine tolerance and humility, sufficient to allow us to accept what may turn out to be unwelcome findings about our own way of life. This applies with equal force to all societies which make up our civilization. We may of course feel that the 'British Way of Life' is almost beyond criticism and that "if only America" or "if only Russia" But this displacement of problems on to outside objects is a phenomenon only too familiar to the psychologist. Problems exist in others too, but in this, as in other matters, therapy must begin at home. The crucial question would seem to be whether as a community we have sufficient tolerance and humility to undertake such a self-examination.

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AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION

BY CHARLES CROWTHER

THE impact of two world wars upon the elaborate structure of our modern civilization, with its continuing threat to the maintenance of the standards and amenities of living that we have been accustomed to regard as the essential minimum, has forced us back to the ever-present awareness of primitive man that our pre-eminent requirement is food. This alone is far from being our sole need, but without it we can satisfy no other. Nor can we in spite of the imposing achievements of science, obtain it as yet, other than through the practice of agriculture which, even in its most highly-elaborated modern forms, still rests mainly upon the great mass of empirical knowledge accumulated by its craftsmen throughout the ages. Some day, no doubt, the scientist will achieve, through the synthesis of proteins, fats, carbohydrates and other essential ingredients of our dietary, the supreme triumph of wresting from nature some considerable part of her age-long monopoly, but that day is not yet in sight. Meanwhile in our dependence upon the farmer it is prudent that we should not only provide for him conditions under which he will be content to perform his task, but that we should also see that he is left with no pretext for ascribing the blame to us if he does not.

By steps that we do not entirely understand the art of husbandry has been steadily developed and perfected, although the first eighteen centuries of the Christian era added astonishingly little of basic importance to the store of accumulated practical knowledge recorded in Roman literature. Of book-learning there was abundance, but in the main it had little influence on actual field practice. Recognition of the need for something more than tradition received its first impulse from the development of the enclosure movement, especially from the middle of the seventeenth century onwards but it was not until the end of the eighteenth century that the need for organized educational facilities received academic recognition by the foundation in 1790 of a chair of agriculture at the University of Edinburgh and the Fordyce Lectureship at Aberdeen, followed in 1796 by the Sibthorpe bequest for the establishment of a Professorship of Rural Economy at Oxford. In each case, however, the aim was probably more that of providing facilities for individuals to devote themselves to study and research in the sciences related to agriculture than to systematic instruction in husbandry, since at that time instruction could amount to little more than teaching what every intelligent farmer knew and practised.

Whether this was so or not, little or no progress was made in the development of agriculture as a teaching subject at the universities until Robert Wallace,

in 1880 or thereabouts, instituted the degree course in agriculture at Edinburgh, which provided for instruction in both the practice and science of crop and animal husbandry. This proved to be a momentous step in the history of our agricultural educational organization, since most of the men who during the next two decades were entrusted with the development of agricultural education in England and Wales were recruited from Edinburgh graduates.

Far more potent in its influence upon the development of agricultural education than these early university foundations was the remarkable advance made by the chemical and physical sciences in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This brought with it not only new knowledge and a clearer understanding of the precise significance of existing knowledge, but also the ability to forecast with more assurance of success the directions in which agricultural practice could be still further improved. With the increase of useful knowledge, notably as to the possibilities and effective use of artificial manures and feeding-stuffs, the farmer's task became more complicated and the need for more systematic training in the newer knowledge than practical experience by itself could give was more clearly recognized.

The final impulse to the establishment of an organization for systematic agricultural education was given in the 'thirties and early 'forties of the last century by the classic work of von Liebig, in which through collation of existing knowledge he was able to deduce the basic chemical principles underlying the processes of plant and animal life and thereby to lay the foundations of a true science of agricultural chemistry.

By the early eighteen-forties the stage was thus set for the beginnings of systematic instruction in the principles and practice of agriculture, though scientific advance was still not ripe for its development at the universities. The initiative was taken, in accordance with the age-long tradition of the land, by the landed interest when, through the enthusiasm of a body of progressive farmers and landowners, implemented through the newly-founded Royal Agricultural Society and supported by royal patronage, the first agricultural college was founded at Cirencester in 1845, and opened to students in April 1846. It survives to-day as the Royal Agricultural College, more prosperous than ever, to celebrate its centenary.

This early enthusiasm seems to have waned in the ensuing golden age of modern British farming of the mid-Victorian era, and no further development in training facilities took place for some fifty years, apart from the establishment of a few private colleges, such as Downton and Aspatria, on the Cirencester model, and the beginnings of some examinations for the encouragement of private study.

With the onset of the prolonged agricultural depression in the 'eighties, however, and the enforced attention of governments to the problem of providing relief and assistance for the industry, the entirely inadequate provision for agricultural education became too patent to be ignored. Since the landed

interest was no longer in a position to provide and finance its own educational requirements the subsequent history of the development of agricultural education has been almost entirely one of a steadily increasing assumption of initiative and responsibility by the State, both directly and through the local government organizations.

The systematic provision for agricultural education, supervised and largely financed from national taxation and local rates, that we now take for granted, had its inception in the Technical Instruction Act of 1888, by which local education authorities were empowered to provide technical, including agricultural, instruction. This was further implemented in 1890 by the allocation to the newly-established Board of Agriculture of the residue ("whisky money") arising under the Local Taxation (Customs and Excise) Act of that year. This led to the establishment in many counties of small staffs for the provision of peripatetic technical instruction in agriculture for farmers and others engaged in work on the land,—a provision that has now become universal throughout the United Kingdom.

To this period belong also the foundations of the two existing endowed residential colleges of Harper Adams and Seale Hayne and the two colleges established by local authorities, Wye and Midland, which have recently become university departments of agriculture. Of the institutions and university departments providing agricultural training to-day only the Royal Agricultural College (1845) and the Agricultural Department of University College, Bangor (1888) date any further back.

Financial aid by the State for agricultural education amounted in 1890-1891 to £4,840, but by 1899-1900 the total expenditure by local authorities in England and Wales had increased to £77,000, of which about two-thirds was provided by the Exchequer. A corresponding increase in institutional facilities took place, and in 1908 the Departmental Committee on Agricultural Education presided over by Lord Reay was able to report that the foundations of a national system of agricultural education had by then been laid. Further provision of funds on a much larger scale for new work was next made possible by the Development and Road Improvement Act, 1909, and a substantial part of this was applied to the creation and extension of advisory work and agricultural research. By 1914 the annual maintenance expenditure by local authorities had risen to £86,000, and annual maintenance grants of about £19,000 were being made by the Board of Agriculture to the university departments and agricultural colleges.

By that time the national agricultural educational organization had developed the basic structure that it was to retain substantially until the end of the 1939-1945 war. Instruction at the highest level was provided by the universities, at the intermediate stage by the agricultural colleges, and at a lower level by the county agricultural education authorities, mainly by peripatetic teachers but supplemented in a few counties (eight in 1914) by the establishment of

residential training centres now called farm institutes. General advisory assistance to farmers and other food producers was provided by the county staffs, this being supplemented by the work of scientific specialists operating from educational centres each serving a group of neighbouring counties. There were also specialized research institutes and grants were made in support of individual research in the universities and colleges.

With the end of the 1914-1918 war, however, the enhanced public appreciation of the importance of home agriculture to the national economy, and the widespread demand for agricultural training from ex-servicemen, necessitated a large and rapid expansion of agricultural education. This the local authorities and institutions would have found difficult to provide but for the greatly enhanced Exchequer assistance made possible through the fund (£850,000) set aside under the Corn Production Acts (Repeal) Act of 1921 and the further £400,000 placed in 1924 at the disposal of the Ministry of Agriculture. Although the greater part of these monies was spent on research—considerable development was also made in instructional and advisory work, the grants to universities and colleges having risen by 1933-1934 to £56,000, and the maintenance expenditure by local authorities to £330,000. By that time, in the period of about forty years, starting from practically nothing, a great national organization had been built up comprising fourteen colleges and university departments for higher education, and for primary education seventeen county farm institutes and a staff of nearly 600 highly qualified men and women spread throughout the counties in constant and close touch with the farming community. In addition a specialist advisory organization and a series of research institutes covered the greater part of the field of scientific research bearing upon agricultural problems. Though still inadequate in relation to the size of its task, its most generally admitted defect was a lack of any effective mechanism for the co-ordination of the various instructional, advisory and research services which were independently controlled. This was substantially the position on the outbreak of the 1939-1945 war.

The plans prepared in advance for this war emergency visualized so great a dislocation of the normal activities of national life as to require an almost complete suspension of institutional courses of agricultural instruction, and a concentration of their resources upon the practical training of women volunteers for farm work recruited by the Women's Land Army. In the case of the colleges and county farm institutes this plan was brought into operation immediately on the outbreak of war, while the university departments made little or no change in their normal procedure. Fortunately also the course of events soon made it possible for most of the colleges to resume their courses, although the injurious effects of the breach of continuity and revision of staffs persisted throughout the first two years, and were accentuated in the later stages by the necessity for some shortening of the period of training in order to meet the requirements of the recruitment boards.

As for the farm institutes the 'black out' of normal training courses persisted throughout the war period and it is only within the last year or so that they have been able to resume their functions. A similar, though less sweeping, restriction was also placed upon the extra-mural instructional activities of the county staffs, most of whom were transferred or seconded to the County War Agricultural Executive Committees, charged with the practical direction of the national food production drive. In due course many of the agricultural educational staff of the counties, colleges and universities were brought into active co-operation with the work of the committees, both for administrative and advisory activities. The value of their work is writ large across the national record. This success represented in large measure the harvest of forty years' steady infiltration of instruction, advice and the results of research into the industry. To those concerned with the work of the educational organization throughout the inter-war years nothing was more encouraging than the steady growth in all parts of the country of a more sympathetic and practical interest taken by the general body of farmers in the work of the educational services, and this did much to help the application of the more drastic measures of persuasion that war conditions imposed.

With this impressive demonstration of the possibilities inherent in an efficient combination of practice with science it seemed that the time had arrived for a review of agricultural education. The necessary action was taken by the appointment in July 1941 by the Minister of Agriculture of a Committee under the chairmanship of the late Lord Justice Luxmoore "to examine the present system of Agricultural Education in England and Wales, and to make recommendations for improving and developing it after the war." The presentation of the Report* of this Committee in January 1943 was followed by the appointment in July 1944 of two Committees, both under the chairmanship of Dr. T. Loveday, and with an element of common membership. The one Committee, appointed by the Minister of Agriculture, was charged "to consider the character and extent of the need for higher agricultural education in England and Wales and to make recommendations as to the facilities which should be provided to meet the needs"; while the other, appointed jointly by the Ministers of Agriculture and of Education, was charged "to advise on all aspects of agricultural education to be provided by Local Education Authorities and particularly on the educational policy and methods of training to be adopted at farm institutes." The Report of the Higher Education Committee was presented in December 1945; the Joint Committee has so far presented a Report (April 1945) on the Provision in Secondary Schools of Courses preparatory to Agricultural Employment, and an Interim Report (November 1946) on Agricultural Education in Agricultural and Horticultural Institutes.† With these reports available the stage was now largely set for the next development of

* Cmd. 6433. H.M. Stationery Office.

† H.M. Stationery Office, 1947.

agricultural educational organization.

Of the committee reports chief interest has been taken in that of the Luxmoore Committee since its wider reference made it possible for it to undertake a broad and frankly critical review of the character extent and quality of the then existing system of institutional and non-institutional education. On the nature and quality of the educational facilities provided the Committee had little serious criticism of the system to offer, but were more outspoken about its organizational defects.

The main defects of the present system are due, in our opinion, to (a) the absence of any authority charged with the positive duty of providing any form of agricultural education, (b) the number of different authorities which, at the present time, provide education, and (c) the diversity of the sources and available means of finance.

As far as (a) was concerned, it was probably not generally recognized that the Ministry of Agriculture up to that time had no direct control over agricultural education, nor power to act on its own initiative in providing, or requiring the provision of new places for institutional education such as colleges or farm institutes. The Ministry could only exercise a partial and indirect measure of control through its grants to and inspection of aided institutions. For farm institutes and extra-mural educational facilities the responsibility for initiative and development lay entirely with the county councils, and being optional was fulfilled more nearly in proportion to the rating capacities of the various areas than to their agricultural educational needs. In general the predominantly agricultural areas were less adequately and efficiently provided for than others.

The solution proposed by the Committee envisaged the setting up of a central statutory authority (which we call the National Council for Agricultural Education) charged with the positive duty of providing, at the cost of the National Exchequer, for the different branches of agricultural education and with the necessary powers to enable it to perform this duty. This council should be so constituted that it is outside the Ministry of Agriculture, but is under the control of the Minister who should be answerable for it to Parliament.

This Council was to be charged with the duty of providing a comprehensive system of agricultural education; it was to take over all existing farm institutes and provide a sufficient number of new ones. It was also to replace the existing county and provincial advisory services by a national advisory service. Its organization, it was thought, should also include an educational inspectorate with

the duty of inspecting the centres of agricultural education other than university departments and of raising and safeguarding the standards of the examinations.

The basic defect of this proposal was that it would have accentuated still further a difficulty that has always been experienced in securing efficient co-ordination of rural educational effort. Throughout modern history the organizational relationships of agricultural education to the national organization for general education has been the subject of recurrent discussion and inquiry. As yet no more than a compromise solution, which has depended for its satisfactory working upon the relationship between the two Ministries concerned, has been

found. There may be a strong case for specialized supervision, and even control, of the more narrowly technical aspects of agricultural education. There can be none for a weakening of its all too slender organizational relationship to the general educational system, such as its transfer to an 'outside' body would involve.

It is not surprising therefore that the proposed new organization has not found official acceptance, but in the subsequent agricultural legislation increased powers have been granted to the Ministry of Agriculture which have made it possible to bring into being already the major reforms that the 'National Council' was to have undertaken. In particular the consolidation of the advisory services into a national advisory service has been effected, there are to be more farm institutes and the arrangements between the two Ministries for the division of responsibility are brought into line with the changed situation in general education created by the Education Act 1944. With the raising of the school leaving age to fifteen and the prospect of compulsory further education to eighteen there will be the double advantage of a longer general education and the raising of the educational standard required for admission to the training institutions.

The reports of the two Loveday Committees deal mainly with matters of specialized detail relating to the estimated needs of agricultural educational facilities for various purposes and how they can best be met quantitatively and qualitatively, and are therefore primarily of interest to those engaged in the organization of the educational services. It is agreed that it is desirable to continue to provide facilities for institutional training at three levels, university, college and farm institute, although the Loveday Higher Committee inclined to anticipate that the need for the intermediate level would tend to diminish as the level of general education rose. The correctness of this view will be determined by educational factors and by the direction and rate of social and economic change. It is already clear that the agricultural student seeking a career not in practical farming but in the advisory or other services ancillary to farming must in future be trained at the highest level in the universities. It is to be expected also that the intending farmer of outstanding intellectual ability will incline more and more to prefer the university to the more restricted cultural and social possibilities of the college or farm institute. His numbers, however, are likely to be only a small fraction of those requiring institutional training, and among the majority of farmer recruits there will always be many above the average in intellectual ability, who will be unable to go to the university and whose potentialities of intellectual development will not be adequately provided for by the one-year course at the farm institute.

So far as the training of the prospective farmer is concerned the basic problem of its precise aim and how best it can be achieved, still awaits solution and urgently needs reconsideration before new schemes and curricula are settled.

All too long the old Edinburgh curriculum, with its purely technical aim, has dominated the farmers' training especially at college and the farm institute. Both agricultural practice and agricultural science have become far too intricate and specialized to warrant continuance of the old mistaken effort to give the student "all there is to know". Such effort can do no more than turn out husbandmen learned in the book-lore but little versed in the practical art; crammed with scientific snippets of knowledge but with little capacity for the application of scientific method. The field of study to be covered in such a curriculum is moreover so wide as to demand for its treatment all the time that the unfortunate student can reasonably be expected to devote to study, leaving him but the haphazard chances of his leisure hours for finding and making the most of the opportunities for cultural and social development that institutional life should provide. The question is whether the aim of our training should be not so much that of "teaching agriculture" but of "teaching the agriculturist". Instead of being content to teach husbandry ought we not to aim at turning out an educated farmer?

Abstract considerations, true, but bringing powerful reinforcement to the case for reconstruction of existing curricula on the purely pragmatic grounds that the extent and diversity of the teaching still being attempted are too great not only for the time available, but also in most cases for the financial and personnel resources of the institution.

Sooner or later, if the education of the farmer is to keep abreast of the development of his general education there must be a breakaway from the present narrow materialistic conception in order to bring within its scope the more humane elements that affect his life. After all the lure of the country resides more in the life than the living, and that life cannot be lived to the full if the achievement of material prosperity is not increased by the ability to see and understand the infinite possibilities of satisfaction to body and mind that country life can afford. In the words of an American writer:

Shall the farmer plough and sow and reap and gather into barns; toil early and late, sweat and strain, merely that he may wring more dollars out of it all? No; the end and purpose of better farm practice and better farm business is a better farm life. If we don't get that, we fail.

(Dr. Charles Crowther, a member of the Higher Education Loveday Committee, was principal of the Harper-Adams Agricultural College from 1922 to 1944.)

SCHOOL AND LIFE

BY WALTER JAMES

The Central Advisory Council for Education is an eminent body set up under the 1944 Act to advise the Minister. It numbers among its members distinguished dons and heads of schools, some scientists, some administrators and one bishop. Its first report on *School and Life** has been much criticized, but for its most striking failure the Council cannot be blamed. Having boldly set out to discuss "The Moral Factor" the members found that they could say nothing of significance about it, because they disagreed on the nature of man and, in consequence, on the ultimate purposes of education. Their impotence (some might hold) falls amusingly, for under this same Act of 1944 religious instruction has for the first time—*pro bono publico*—been made compulsory in schools.

Having disagreed, they preferred, rather than cut the chapter, to tell people how it came about. The moral values, without which no society can exist, grow out of an accepted tradition. Unfortunately the tradition of this country, stemming from Greece and Rome and Palestine, is disintegrating. "Thus the characteristic feature of the present situation is a greatly increased moral perplexity and confusion." And a little later:

For a large number of men and women science has been enthroned as the authority and hope for man's future; for them science has displaced God, and the scientific attitude has eclipsed both the Christian and the classical lights.

We may suppose that this "large number" had their representatives on the Council, beside the Christians and the classicists, and that this confrontation of the unlike, which merely reflects the present intellectual condition of society, stultified the chapter. But, unsettled in their minds, they still gave advice. What did they urge the schools to do? To present children with the different elements of our tradition—Greek, Roman, Christian and scientific, not forgetting "other codes of conduct resting upon different beliefs"—and to leave the choice to them. Every issue is declared open; the hapless child of our time is confronted with the serried ranks of the philosophers and told to take his pick. The Council show little sense of the burden they cast so urbanely on young shoulders.

The members must be distinguished from the Council. Most of them will have convictions, but they do not share them, so the Council has no convictions. The Council, in fact, is in the state of man as described by Pascal:

* H.M. Stationery Office. 2s.

When I see the blindness and the wretchedness of man, when I regard the whole silent universe, and man without light, left to himself, without knowing who has put him there, what he has come to do, what will become of him at death, and incapable of all knowledge, I become terrified, like a man who should be carried in his sleep to a dreadful desert island, and should awake without knowing where he is, and without means of escape. And thereupon I wonder how people in a condition so wretched do not fall into despair.

But Councils cannot despair; only their members can.

As the Council's predicament is that of our society, it is worth examining. What Aristotle said of the State is equally true of any educational system. "He who would duly inquire about the best form of State ought first to determine which is the most eligible life; while this remains uncertain the best form of the State must also be uncertain." A national scheme of education must stay bereft of purpose so long as it is uninformed by an accepted view of the "eligible life".

In the past the needed view of the "eligible life" has been presented by religion. It is doubtful whether philosophy based on some conception of "the good of the community" or "the progressive development of scientific enlightenment" can take its place. Compared with religion, as Professor Toynbee has pointed out, philosophy lacks spiritual vitality, and it does not touch the great mass of simple men. Rivarol put it well: "Let history remind you that, wherever religion and barbarism come together, religion triumphs; but that, wherever barbarism and philosophy meet, barbarism is the victor." Polybius and Burke would have agreed with him heartily, though neither were markedly religious men.

So important is religion, not only for giving direction to education, but for forming the crust of social habit and supplying moral standards to society, that there are strong calls upon us to return to it for solely practical reasons. Obviously the teachers of a great nation cannot for long be fed on the stony diet of "The Moral Factor".

To any return to religion for practical reasons only, however, serious objections would seem to exist. First, there is the old truth which Dr. W. R. Inge stated in the July issue of *THE FORTNIGHTLY*: "Religion is usually caught, not taught." If this is true of individuals, it is certainly true of societies. A religion that had to be re-imposed by the State, because its own votaries had failed in their mission, might no longer have the old magic. The Holy Spirit, so the most ordinary Christian might suppose, is not outpoured by earthly decree.

The second objection to any course of this sort in Britain is that our predicament is Western in character and not to be escaped by insular action. The spiritual health of these islands is bound up with that of the West, the great civilization in which our people share. If the whole body is corrupt, health cannot be restored to a single limb. A return to religion in Britain is unlikely without a similar return in Europe; certainly it would be unavailing without

its counterpart, for the West will be saved whole, if at all.

The third objection to an imposed return to religion for social and political reasons was long ago put most eloquently by G. Lowes Dickinson in his chapters on "Religion: A Criticism and a Forecast".* It is one thing to look into history and trace the part religion plays in the growth of civilizations and in the life of healthy societies. It is quite another to set to work, by compulsion and propaganda, to restore by force something that first won men's hearts as a lover his bride, through gentleness and sacrifice. Grant that, for any reasons, the State may impose religion, and the principle of the Inquisition has been embraced.

The Christian in England will probably be restrained by these three objections from assenting to any future attempt at imposing upon his agnostic neighbours or their children the faith he holds. At the same time the chapter on "The Moral Factor" makes him heavy of heart, for he knows better than many what its sterile counsels portend. It is not pleasant to live in a disintegrating society, even if there is still the hope that it may be saved by example. For the average Christian to-day realizes that his example, and his Church's, is not good enough; he is touched in his own way by the agnostic sickness. Nevertheless, his one assurance is that more powers are concerned with this great matter than are visible. "Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world."

* *Letters from John Chinaman and Other Essays*. Allen & Unwin, 1946.

THE ROLE OF LITERATURE

BY PHYLLIS BENTLEY

AT its nineteenth International Congress, held in Zürich in the first week of June, the world association of writers known as P.E.N. found itself, like many other societies, institutions and nations to-day, in a transitional stage where its aims had dissolved from their wartime fusion but had not yet coalesced into their post-war form. The question of what this post-war form should be, what, that is, the rôle of literature in general and the P.E.N. in particular should be in the modern world, though sometimes the open subject of discussion, was more often pushed impatiently aside; nevertheless it was this question which really emerged as the special P.E.N. problem, now clearly posed for solution by future P.E.N. Congresses.

The avowed purpose of the P.E.N. is to promote friendship and intellectual co-operation between men of letters in all countries, in the interests of *literature, freedom of artistic expression and international goodwill*. The Congress found itself torn between the conflicting claims of these three ideals. During the war, freedom of artistic expression became a national no less than a political, spiritual and literary question. If one believed in freedom of expression one was ranged on the side of the United Nations against Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's Italy and the Mikado's Japan. Now that the war is over and nationals of former enemy countries are released from their allegiance (sometimes forced) to their respective dictators, it becomes the duty of the P.E.N., in the interests of literature and international goodwill, to transcend these national barriers; at the same time freedom of artistic expression must continue to be sternly safeguarded. Expressed concretely, this means that the P.E.N. should seek to re-establish its branches in former enemy countries, at the same time insisting on certain guarantees in order to ensure that, as Vercors (of *Le Silence de la Mer*) put it, no P.E.N. member from an occupied country need fear that he might receive as colleague a man who had been his torturer during the war. Naturally there were divergences of opinion on the degree of guarantee necessary; the occupied countries demanded strictness in the interests (paradoxically enough) of freedom of expression, which must not be threatened by the P.E.N.'s lending support to its opponents; the less embittered countries leaning to a somewhat milder control in the interests of international goodwill.

A really passionate debate, in which the speeches were not on a very high level because the ideals animating them were all taken for granted and only the details embodying hates and fears were discussed, accordingly took place

on the proposed reconstitution (under control) of the German P.E.N. The vote was taken by roll-call—always an exciting and solemn moment—and the reconstitution was passed "in principle" by a substantial majority. It was a pleasure to all present to hear the French delegation generously voting yes. An even more passionate debate—and one, to speak frankly, on an even lower level—followed on the constitution of the committee of control; but after some hours of intemperate utterance which the excessive warmth of the day did nothing to mitigate, a workable compromise was at length reached, mainly through the intelligent action of Margaret Storm Jameson, English member of the International Executive. The Congress sighed with relief and went off to enjoy an evening excursion on the lake of Zürich, one of the admirable arrangements for our pleasure made by our kind Swiss hosts.

This re-establishment of the German non-Nazi P.E.N., with the re-establishment (not, of course, with similar controls) of the Austrian centre, were the main or at any rate the most obvious achievements of the Congress. It is not without significance that the P.E.N., the first international association to cause its Nazi members to withdraw—for this happened under the presidency of H. G. Wells in 1933—is now the first international association to re-establish its German non-Nazi centre. This is not the work of chance or a mere coincidence, but the result of an honourable adherence to its fundamental principles.

Another action which successfully fused the P.E.N. principles was the passing of the English proposal incorporating what was known as "the American Resolution" of last year's Stockholm Conference into the International Rules, to form a permanent part of the P.E.N. Charter. This resolution pledges P.E.N. members firmly to the principle of a free press—"unhampered transmission of thought within each nation and between all nations"—but equally firmly to oppose the evils to which a free press is subject, namely deliberate falsehood and interested or merely ignorant distortion of facts. It calls on members also "with that great power of the written word" to dispel hatreds and champion the ideals of one humanity living in peace in one world.

Expressed in these general terms such resolutions are well within the scope of P.E.N. action, but when specific names and peoples are mentioned, resolutions are apt to become, or at least to appear, "political" and thus cease to deserve their inclusion in P.E.N. agenda. Unfortunately a resolution on the encouragement of Jewish culture, for which everyone wished to vote, contained two unlucky phrases which might bear a political interpretation. The delegate from Arab Lebanon so interpreted them, and a debate ensued which the Congress decided not to continue, though with regret that the matter could not be more comprehensively considered.

The difficulty of the problem of the rôle of the P.E.N., and by analogy of literature, in the modern world could not have been more effectively illustrated. Between the literary and the political championing of cultural causes

there lies but a razor edge. Again, Thomas Mann delivered, on the opening morning of the Conference, a lecture on the philosophy of Nietzsche. Is that political or literary? Or both? We knew without argument that it was right for us to listen to it, a privilege and a pleasure; nevertheless there might be times and circumstances in which such a lecture might take on "political" meaning. For literature to seek the escape of the ivory tower while the peoples toil in the blood, sweat and tears of politics below, is certainly "*trahison des clercs*", but it is equally treason to give up to politics what is meant for mankind; this is the problem confronting literature and the P.E.N., put in plain terms.

On the literary side of the Congress, certain attitudes were approved, certain steps taken. The English moved a resolution calling for "more literature" in future Congresses, asking in particular for a report each year on the contemporary progress of the literature of the country acting as host, so that P.E.N. delegates might be genuinely informed of fresh artistic achievements and fresh technical trends. Less attention than the constructive policy he outlined deserved was paid to the speech of the International Secretary, Hermon Ould, who urged the P.E.N. to devote itself to its real and special task, the fight against the enemies of literature. Certain tendencies of mass production and standardization, the squeezing out of the small publisher, the withdrawal to radio and film of literary talent, the effect of shortages of paper and labour—on all these points literature needs active assistance. One might add that the general faith in the solution of problems by intelligence and goodwill rather than by corruption and violence needs to be strengthened and supported, and this is a task to which literature might devote itself without violating its integrity or lowering its standards. Stephen Spender, who attended the Congress as representative of UNESCO, gave a comprehensive and striking account of the work of UNESCO in aid of literature, speaking of the reconstruction of education in devastated countries, the fight to reduce illiteracy, the provision of cultural equipment, the promotion of translations, the surveys of the conditions of literature in some fields where spontaneous native forms of expression are disappearing, and of the rôle of the arts in education in those and other fields. It was agreed that the P.E.N. could and would give useful assistance in some of these activities by the provision of information and that expenses incurred in this work would (in principle) be reimbursed by UNESCO, whose budget however required strict concentration on essential tasks. A very real harmony pervaded the Congress as it contemplated the contribution it might make to these cultural tasks, so universally approved. For my own part I wished heartily that a constructive policy of measures to preserve and improve the art of literature, to increase its study, to encourage faith in its value and to facilitate its practice would soon replace on the P.E.N. agenda the semi-political resolutions which are the aftermath of war.

Perhaps the most illuminating discussion of the problem of the P.E.N. was, however, made after the Congress had closed, by the newly elected Vice-President, Denis Saurat, professor of French Language and Literature in the University of London. (The P.E.N. has not previously had a Vice-President, but the election as President of Maurice Maeterlinck, who accepted after explaining that his age and health made active participation difficult for him, rendered the new office advisable.) M. Saurat offered to give an address in Zürich University on the morning following the closing session, to explain his own views of the rôle of literature in life. A lively, witty, practised lecturer, M. Saurat gave a brilliant exposition of this difficult matter with which, as has been said, the Congress had been whether consciously or unconsciously struggling all week. He pierced the core of the subject at once by saying that two great matters are not going well in modern life, namely politics and religion, and literature is naturally tempted to intervene in these matters and attempt to set them right. The temptation should be resisted, though not entirely. It is not literature's duty to fill up the holes in politics and religion. Indeed it is literature's duty not to cede itself to *any* ideal, but to criticize all in the name of its own ideal, namely that of harmony and beauty. This, the ideal of art, is more disinterested even than that of religion, for even religion has "*un but utilitaire*," the saving of man's soul. Literature, an intellectual form of beauty, satisfies man more completely than any other form of art, appealing both to intelligence and heart. The P.E.N. is an important twentieth century conception; we do not nowadays boast great single geniuses but perhaps, said M. Saurat with a smile, the whole P.E.N., a plurality of authors, adds up to one such great spirit. For writers of many lands to meet, to talk, is a great thing; for so will gradually disengage itself a common ideal of art, in spite of diverse religious and political ideologies. He invited the members of the P.E.N. to lay aside for a time during International Congresses their own ideals which they held as citizens, in favour of this common ideal of art. This admirable discourse freshened for all who heard it their faith in the P.E.N. which had been perhaps a trifle weather-beaten by the week's political storms.

The P.E.N. is now so large and important a body, and its yearly Congresses receive so much attention—350 members attended, representing thirty-four nations—that it would seem wise to conduct these Congresses on rather more formal lines than have been necessary in the past. An English member of great political experience with whom I discussed this suggested that definite Standing Orders should be drawn up by an appropriately chosen international sub-committee, that the text of all resolutions should be considered with great care by the International Executive and that a very detailed Agenda should be issued in good time, showing resolutions and amendments accompanied by the names of proposing and seconding delegations. Much of this is, of course, attempted already, but some nations through no fault of their own lack the

experience of democratic procedure so familiar to more fortunate countries, and are somewhat at sea among amendments, substantive resolutions and such phrases as "lie on the table"; to them a set of printed rules and a very detailed Agenda would be definitely helpful. "It is easier in England where procedure is settled and known to everybody," as the very able interpreter remarked to me. The contribution made to world order in every sphere by the development and acceptance of a recognized democratic form of conducting meetings is really immense, and the Anglo-Saxons are entitled to be proud that they make this contribution.

In one respect, however, the English cannot be proud. With honourable exceptions, we remain shockingly poor linguists. A German delegate of the London group who chanced to sit beside me during Thomas Mann's lecture wrote down for me, paragraph by paragraph while Mann spoke, a summary *in English* of what he was saying. It was an admirable linguistic feat—and one so impossible for me in a reverse direction that I have decided to spend any leisure hours next winter in renovating my French and building up my scanty German as a small but necessary contribution to world peace.

MARRIAGE

BY HERBERT PALMER

THERE'D be no world without love,
For nought could abide.
We were born through bright love,
Or love crucified.

Oh, too oft is love lame—
Pierced, twisted and bowed!
And few see the flame
In the rent of Life's cloud.

Here too many choose wrong;
So they love but a day.
Blood and limbs sing Life's song,
But the spirit's away.

Yet they wed ere Time rolls;
And the dance of Death starts,—
No communion of souls
And no blending of hearts.

So the moon swirls in gloom,
And the sun veers aside.
Bride turns from her groom,
And the groom from the bride.

Let the winds hide their shame!
Love twisted and bowed!
How few see the flame
In the rent of the cloud!

Looks and lips sing the song,
Hair, sinews, and eyes.
All's right; but all's wrong
When the Soul gets Love's size.

For it spurns the false strength,
Every lure that feeds lies,
Brazen width without length,
And the wing that ne'er flies.

How they moil, green to red,
Shapes and hues that can't mix!
There are nails in Love's bed
And the marsh fires of Styx.

When the nightingale sings
The rook takes the hour,
And the monkey-foot clings
To the meadow-sweet flower.

Time halts ere he rolls,
But the dance of Death starts,—
No communion of souls,
And no blending of hearts.

Thus bad swallows good,
And the winds coil and strive.
Faith wilts in the mud,
And the bee eats the hive.

Sin and shame, sin and shame!
Love twisted and bowed!
How few see the flame
In the rent of the cloud!

Learn of fifty that went
And of fifty that are!
How few probed the rent
To the intimate star!—

To the light that shines warm
And entrancingly kind,
A sure refuge in storm
And a power unconfined;

Where two lives become one,
And resolve the same rune,

Where the soar of the sun
Hugs the dance of the moon;

Where to die or to live
Is in essence the same
If together they give
Their strength to the flame;

Where heart, limb and soul,
Body, spirit and mind
In unshakeable whole
Are enlaced and entwined;

Where the closest embrace
Is a sacrament song,
Where the heart shares its grace,
And the spirit its wrong.

REGATTA

BY E. M. MARTIN

THE tide returns at length, covering all
The estuary; waters meander
While the holly, and blue sea lavender
Are strewn by the incoming swell; they fall
By enamelled pools; spread wide is the call
Of the sea bird, his note is harbinger,
He has covered the course, a messenger,
With tales of the sea the mind to enthrall.
But now the tension increases, the pull
Is on hempen sail and rigging. For youth
The signal is given, the contention
Is for mastery, even as the full
Tide and changing wind drive some on uncouth
Sandbanks: the battle of boats has begun.

MUSICAL DEDICATIONS

BY VINCENT SHEEAN

ON the evening of May 7, 1747, as the king of Prussia was about to begin his evening concert, a chamberlain came in with a list of the travellers who had just arrived in Potsdam by coach. Frederick was a talented and experienced flute-player with a repertoire of some three hundred concerti grossi in which he performed almost every night for forty years, with the exception of Mondays and Fridays, which were opera nights. The room, we must imagine, was one of those salons at Sans-Souci with long windows and delicate, elaborate decorations, and the forty gentlemen who played various parts at various times in the chamber music must have been seated in their places, either to play or to listen—wondering, perhaps, if the King was going to keep better time tonight, or whether he would allow his rank to betray his taste as it often did. There were no ladies, for he kept them isolated, perhaps because the obligation to be polite interfered with his musical and intellectual diversions; and there were always more Frenchmen than Germans. "What's this?" says Frederick, rising from his chair. "Old Bach," says he, "old Bach has come by the coach, gentlemen. Send for him at once. We must have him here."

Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach—"young Bach"—must have been absent that evening. He had been Frederick's cembalist for seven years and was already longing for freedom. He must have been at his own lodgings in Potsdam to receive his father. For we are told that the chamberlain sent at once for "old Bach" and the celebrated contrapuntist and pedagogue of the Thomas-Schule in Leipzig, tired and dusty from his long journey in the stage coach, was made to come to Sans-Souci at once without washing or changing his clothes. He would have liked a chance to put on his Lutheran cantor's black robe, without which he never travelled, but the King's impatience gave him no time.

We know Frederick II's habits. When he sat down to his evening meal he liked to stay at table for hours, talking of philosophy, literature, history and the like. Sometimes he sat down at seven o'clock and rose from the table at midnight. This being so, it is likely that the chamber music concerts were before dinner; and this would fit in more plausibly with the time of arrival of the stage coach. We are thus to imagine Sans-Souci on a spring evening, in the time of crocuses and violets, with old Bach, who was sixty-two, and the King, who was thirty-five, in delighted converse. We do not know the terms in which they talked—authorities never give enough detail—or even the language,

but it was probably German. And from what we know of Frederick it was probably in that peculiar third person form ("er") which has since disappeared from the German language, but which in those days indicated address to a person of inferior rank. If it was in any other style of address the condescension of Frederick would have been even more phenomenal than it was.

For the King in fact insisted on showing Bach all over the house, abandoning the concert for the evening, and asking the famous pedagogue to try the new Silbermann pianofortes he had bought. Bach asked Frederick for a theme and the King improvised one on the flute, asking the master to produce a six-part fugue on it. This Bach provided then and there, to the admiration of the forty courtiers and musicians who had trailed them from room to room. When the tour and all the compliments were over, and Bach was at home again in Leipzig, he wrote down a version of this six-part fugue on the King's theme and sent it to Potsdam, throwing in for good measure a trio for flute, violin and clavier. This was the *Musikalisches Opfer* of July 7, 1747, dedicated to "a sovereign admired in music as in all other sciences of war and peace."

There is no probability that Frederick appreciated these works and there is no certainty that he ever played them. Bach was not much appreciated as a composer in those days; it was as a dazzling performer and contrapuntist that he had acquired fame. What Frederick liked was a much more pedestrian music, principally that which was composed for him by his flute-master, Quantz. And what is more, the accomplishment shown by royal and aristocratic ensemble playing seems far greater to us, through the enchantment of distance, than it really was. Years later when Mozart was at Potsdam and Frederick the Great's nephew, Frederick William II, asked his opinion of the chamber orchestra, the young Salzburger said: "If the gentlemen would play together they would make a better effort." It is probable that Frederick the Great's players were much the same, since a taste for music, on the part of the busy and mighty, is by no means a guarantee of excellence in its performance. Emanuel Bach was unhappy for twenty-seven years in Frederick's service because of the stereotyped repertoire and the impossibility of forcing the King to play in precise time—Emanuel Bach, the father of modern pianoforte playing, of whom Mozart said: "*Er ist der Vater, wir sind die Buben.*" We need not, therefore, exaggerate the virtues of Frederick II's musicality. It was probably like his French poems and prose, a tribute to taste and to the fascination of art rather than a contribution to its living body.

And yet how charming is the scene, how gentle the climate of those relationships! The relation of English poets and their patrons in the same and earlier periods is not really comparable, because explicit flattery in words is essentially a vulgar and mercenary enterprise, demeaning poet and patron alike. It becomes bearable only when the distance between the two is astronomical, as it was (for example) between Racine and Louis XIV. But the flattery of music is delicate, pure, indirect; it seems to ennoble the patron by including him in a

sort of worship given the abstract beauty of form; it is not an obeisance from one man to another, but an act of generosity in which the prince is forgiven his power and the rich man his wealth for the space of those moments in which they share to some degree in the glory of creation.

Bach, of course, was a practical man. For all his Lutheran piety he did not hesitate to write music for the Catholic version of the mass when he wished to please the Catholic King of Saxony; and, fortifying this compromise by some examples of his more secular art, he obtained the official title of "*Königliche Hof-komponist*." But his compromises were extraordinarily few, and if every compromise with principle produced something like the B-minor Mass we should indeed welcome them all. In his daily life at Leipzig he did not come much into contact with the great; it was a world regulated by the needs of the churches, the schools and the University. Neither Potsdam nor Dresden affected it much. The moment we move on to the Viennese composers we are in the midst of the full tide of eighteenth century patronage, and the stately names fall upon the pages like leaves in autumn. Esterhazy, Radziwill, Lobkowitz, Lichnowsky, Erdody, Kinsky, Galitzin—to all these feudatories and their princesses were inscribed a great part of the work of Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven. The economic reasons were apparent: many of the Viennese princes maintained orchestras large or small, and several of them played instruments or sang. A composer had a better chance of earning a living if he wrote for these gentlemen and tactfully dedicated his compositions to them. Sometimes (as in the case of Haydn with Prince Esterhazy) a master would be employed for years in the establishment of one of these princes. In 1784 Mozart's papers show that he practically lived on the Esterhazy and Galitzin establishments, alternating his performances between them; and from this arrangement came great work—the pianoforte concerti in E-flat, B-flat and D (numbers 449, 450 and 451 in the Köchel catalogue) and the quintet in E-flat (K.452). Mozart's difficulties of temperament probably were as much responsible for his poverty as anything else, since there is ample evidence of the interest taken in him and in his work by a number of the Viennese patrons. And the interest worked both ways: Karl Lichnowsky, his pupil, who was afterwards Beethoven's patron, enjoyed his genuine friendship.

It is Beethoven, however, whose whole life is a kind of recital of dedications. By the time he arrived from Bonn there had taken place a change of heart towards musicians. Perhaps the tragic death of Mozart and his burial in a pauper's grave had made some difference; it must have remained forever in the sensitive mind of Karl Lichnowsky. At any rate, Beethoven was consistently supported throughout his life by the Viennese aristocracy, and in spite of his violently revolutionary principles he reciprocated by inscribing to them all the best of his works in large and small forms. They permitted him every liberty. He must have been the worst possible guest in the house, since he would not pay the slightest attention to the hours of meals, came and went at

his pleasure, had no manners and no tact. There were times when his quarters were kept for him in two or three palaces at once, while he was off somewhere else in a rented room. Prince Lichnowsky was especially forbearing with him; he instructed the servants that if his own bell should ring at the same time as Beethoven's, the composer's should be answered first. When Beethoven discovered this he fell into one of his fits of egalitarian passion and went out and hired a servant of his own to answer his bell. He was so class-conscious that the least attempt on the part of any of the princes to infringe on his prerogatives threw him into a rage. There was a famous incident when Prince Lobkowitz, for a joke, surreptitiously learned a new Andante of Beethoven's and played it to him as a work of his own, thus bringing upon himself a terrible outburst of insult and vituperation. And yet to this same Lobkowitz Beethoven dedicated his third, fifth and sixth symphonies, the quartet in E-flat (Op. 74) and the exquisite song cycle "*An die ferne Geliebte*."

It used to be a sort of game among musical historians to search Beethoven's inscriptions and dedications for evidence as to who "the Beloved" was. A favourite candidate with some of these writers was the Countess Giulietta Guicciardi, who was supposed to be the mysterious person to whom those two passionate love-letters found in Beethoven's desk after his death were addressed. The sonata in C-sharp minor (Op. 27, No. 2) had been dedicated to her years before; but her own explanation is so matter-of-fact as to dispel any notion of a life-long romance. "Beethoven gave me the rondo in G," she said, "but since he wanted to dedicate something to Princess Lichnowsky he took the rondo away and gave me the sonata in C-sharp minor instead." Thus coolly she removes the moonlight from the Moonlight Sonata.

Beethoven, of course, had practical reasons for every dedication he made, but he seldom went far afield: everybody to whom he inscribed a work had shown him some sign of appreciation, and was thus included in his act of worship, given the benefit, at least, of a generous doubt. The exception, I must say, is the King of Prussia, Frederick William III, who was a dull dog and in no way entitled to have the Ninth Symphony dedicated to him. On the other hand the lovely, melancholy Empress of Russia (Marie-Louise of Baden, who took the name of Elizabeth Feodorovna as wife of Alexander I) deserved something better than the Polonaise in C (Op. 89). She was genuinely fond of music and during the Congress of Vienna she went out of her way to distinguish Beethoven with her attention—some say at Archduke Rudolf's, some say at Prince Razumovsky's house—in a way which aroused much jealousy. In his last days, stone deaf and hopelessly immersed in trouble over that worthless nephew of his, Beethoven seems to have entertained great hope for help from Russia, either from Galitzin or the Empress. He would have done better to dedicate the Ninth Symphony to Elizabeth Feodorovna and let Frederick William have the Polonaise.

But in all the inscriptions and dedications of the golden age of music, an age

which at every turn exhibits the relations of art and society in a light altogether different from that we know—a candle-light, perhaps, falling from crystal chandeliers on bare shoulders and soft silk—there are two in particular which delight and bemuse me. In these brief notes I have given most weight to what was, after all, the chief motive in all such inscriptions, the desire of the artist to interest or pay tribute to a patron. By far the greater number of the dedications in music were of that kind. There were notable exceptions: Mozart dedicated six string quartets to Haydn, for example, and wrote lovely piano music for Frau von Trattner, the wife of the Viennese bookseller. But my choice out of them all would be the second motet of Bach, "*Jesu, meine Freude*," for two sopranos, alto, tenor and bass unaccompanied, written for the funeral of Frau Käse, the wife of the Ober Postmeister of Leipzig; and the C-sharp minor quartet of Beethoven (Op. 131), dedicated to Baron von Stutterheim.

Frau Käse, indeed! Can you not see her now, the good, firm Lutheran lady, with her prim mouth and plump cheeks, rustling in silk to the Thomas-Kirche on a Sunday morning? Underneath her dress she wears at least a dozen petticoats, the inner ones of flannel and the outer ones of stiffly starched material that help to push her external garments into a billowing solemnity. The dress, I think, is of black silk with broad bands of velvet, and she has a white fichu and cap of the best lace from the Low Countries. Her mittened hands clasp a prayer book: *ein' feste Burg*, she seems to say, is all around us. No question upon the order of society or the destiny of man has disturbed her neat and dutiful mind from the cradle to the grave; she is Mistress Cheese, wife of the High Postmaster of Leipzig. She knows how to preserve fruit and keep a house as it should be kept, and her children were brought up in the right way, even though they do say that little Hans was rather wild in his younger days and Gretel, too, had moments of rebellion; Frau Käse did not permit them to show these aberrations in the Postmaster's parlour. Now, at last, she goes to her reward, with all her petticoats and her silk and laces immured in a coffin of black and silver, her mittened hands folded on her bosom. There she lies before the altar, immortal to the end of time, because over that coffin there float, in the voices of the boys from the Thomas-Schule, on this Sunday, July 18, 1723, the long, pure phrases of the motet "*Jesu, meine Freude*," the prayer of an incomparable genius. Never could Frau Käse have known or guessed that her death would make her live for ever.

As for Baron von Stutterheim, he probably did know, in a vague way: after all, Beethoven was abundantly appreciated in Austria and a multitude followed him to the grave. But the way in which the Baron knew was that of the barrack-room, the small country house, the fringes of the court, the coffee-houses of Vienna. I can hear him after dinner in the regimental mess, talking to his officers over the port. "You've heard of the composer Beethoven," says he, more and more offhand about it as the years pass. "Queer duck, you know. Never saw the fellow, but do you know what he did? Damnedest thing you

ever heard of. Dedicated a string quartet to me. Had some crazy idea I might be kind to a worthless nephew of his that used to be in the regiment. A good-for-nothing lout if I ever saw one. We soon got rid of him. What? What's that? Oh, no, good God no, I never *heard* the thing. Music's not much in my line. My wife's cousin Sophie—she plays the piano very nicely—says this Beethoven was a terrific character in his day. Old-fashioned now, of course. Sophie says he got deaf as a post and all his music shows it. She says this quartet he dedicated to me sounds as if he was not only deaf but crazy. Just my luck. He might have given me a good sound march or a waltz, something the regiment could use, but he sends me a blasted string quartet! Oh, no, I didn't keep it. I sent it to my wife in Vienna and she mislaid it somewhere. Almost anything can happen to a fellow when he gets into the army, but damned if I'm not the first colonel I ever heard of that had a string quartet dedicated to him."

In the autumn of 1826 Beethoven and that wretched nephew Carl took refuge at Johann Beethoven's house at Gneixendorf, about fifty miles west of Vienna. Johann was the ridiculous brother who, after buying a house in the country, had his visiting cards engraved: "Johann Beethoven, *Gutsbesitzer*." (Johann Beethoven, Man of Property). He was a stingy, disagreeable and stupid man, married to a flighty wife; his brother the composer, loud, rude and deaf, found him and his wife alike insupportable. The nephew, Carl, having failed in the University and in the Polytechnic school and then attempted suicide, was arrested by the police and banished from Vienna; in all his dramas old Ludwig gave him the most adoring support. Carl had been the legacy of the other brother, the light-fingered Caspar, now fortunately dead. At Gneixendorf, Johann's wife flirted with the worthless nephew; the composer, at work on his last two quartets, was a tempest of alternating rages and wild good humour; Johann busied himself trying to save money on fires and food. On top of all this the absurd miser served notice on Beethoven that he was going to have to pay for his keep and that of nephew Carl; so the composer decided to risk the ire of the police and return to Vienna. He had to do so in an open post-chaise, caught a cold in his stomach, took to his bed and never rose again. During those last weeks of his life young Carl made off, of course, having called for his uncle a casual doctor whose name he obtained from a neighbouring billiard-hall. Beethoven's devotion to the nephew never flagged, in spite of everything, and as death approached he decided to make another attempt to help him. Carl was with his regiment by now; the colonel of the regiment was named Baron von Stutterheim; Beethoven decided to withdraw the dedication originally intended for Prince Galitzin and to inscribe the quartet in C-sharp minor, Op. 131, to Baron von Stutterheim.

The pathos of the act should not blind us to its majestic confidence. Beethoven was as sure of the immortality of his work as Shakespeare was of his. Old and ill now—he was only fifty-six but he seemed eighty—he felt that nothing

he could do for the commander of his nephew's regiment would confer a more permanent renown than the dedication of this master work. Immersed as he was in music, living it, breathing it, dying in it, it never would have occurred to him that the Baron von Stutterheim could not understand an honour so great. It is true that he regarded all his work up to now as merely preparatory to the work he intended to do: "a few notes," was the way he described the body of his life's accomplishment. And yet he certainly did know that it lived of its own life, organic but indestructible; he was fierce against any who wished to change it (as Sonntag did with the soprano part of the Ninth Symphony). "There it lies," he said, "and there it must lie." So, struggling with the fever and the dropsy, attended only by the fourteen-year-old son of his old friend Breuning, visited sometimes by the awe-struck young Schubert, he got through the winter, hoping that even if his own greatest work might never come to be written, some part of the last firm flow of his heart's blood might be of use to his nephew Carl, through the kind offices of the Colonel Baron von Stutterheim.

CORRESPONDENCE

GERMAN OPINION

To the Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY,

Sir,

I have read the articles about Germany with great interest. Dr. Friedmann's survey about the Military Government of Germany* is, I think, the best I have read. His frankness is, by German standards, astonishing—but I think we have to accustom ourselves again to the freedom of the press. On most points he is right, though nobody, except the tough Nazis, doubts the goodwill of most MG-men. But is it a question of personnel, and I think it was true of the former German army too that not the best men were in administration. Everybody who has a good job at home, wishes to go home.

Many people in Germany—I only speak of those democrats who wholeheartedly are democrats and not pseudo-democrats—think that British policy as regards Germany has no clear line, and a lot of measures, which nobody can understand, seems to be a proof. For example, the introduction of double summer time, which has given the Nazis a lot of water on the mill, though it seems to be a question of minor importance. But a lot of people think this introduction to be one of the measures to destroy German *Lebenswillen* (will to survive).

"Pattern for German Agriculture" by Hermann Levy† is another article which has interested me very much. It is a key to the question of German land reform, and I myself think it is a main task to improve German agriculture. But the opposition, especially of

* THE FORTNIGHTLY, April and May 1947.

† April 1947.

the great farmers, is too hard. They are in opposition even to the mildest form of land reform.

The article "The Press in the Provinces"* has interested me especially, because I myself am a journalist. Only a few people in Germany know that—in England—there is a provincial press. Most people think that there are only the *Daily Mail*, *Daily Express* and *The Times*. I discovered this, when I gave recently a survey of the English and American press in a school for printers.

Yours faithfully,

A GERMAN.

Germany.

RESPONSIBILITY OF GENERALS

To the Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY,

Sir,

Mr. F. Elwyn Jones is indignant in the July issue of THE FORTNIGHTLY, with those who sought to excuse Kesselring and implores them to "tread gently."

I have not read these apologists but in this matter have always felt that it is the "liberal" somewhat anti-militaristic school who should tread gently. I suspect Mr. Elwyn Jones of being of that school. For in broad terms the case against the German Generals is that they did not oppose their government's (Hitler's) methods on the ground of conscience. I personally agree with that indictment, but have an uncomfortable feeling that many English who call loudest for independent expression in a serving German General are the same persons who would abhor this trait in the British prototype. Even Field-Marshal Montgomery's innocent utterances are not met with excessive cordiality, and if he, or other generals displayed that "political skill and principle" for lack of which German generals are reproved, I shudder to think of the frenzied flutter in the political dovecots.

The difficulty that meets the anti-militaristic mind is the fact that the conscience can be jarred by other things than brutality to an enemy. A senior soldier may feel that certain government action, such as the pre-war lack of armament, will prove injurious to his own nation. And, surely, a man's conscience may trouble him if he is asked to acquiesce in steps harmful to his own kith and kin. Should he be permitted to speak out boldly? I think so. But I fear that many would prefer dumb acquiescence. If so, is it not difficult for them to blame German Generals? Should they not "tread gently"?

Yours faithfully,

H. MINCHIN, Brigadier (Retd.)

Kent.

* By Newsman. THE FORTNIGHTLY, May 1947.

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A RECONSIDERATION OF GEORGE ELIOT

BY RICHARD CHURCH

I CAN recall nothing worthwhile written about George Eliot since Leslie Stephen's biography at the beginning of the century. There have been a few attempts to portray her in France, and a book by one Romieu was translated into English about twenty years ago. It was a facile piece of work.

Mr. Bullett's new biography and study of her novels* will do much to atone for the neglect of George Eliot. He has had recourse to the American research into the problems of her life (especially those relating to her 'marriage' with George Henry Lewes), and he has re-read her books with the eye of a mature critic and creative artist. The result is a book which one reads with delight because of its distinction of style, its insight into motive and achievement, its nice balance between detachment and sympathy.

Marian Evans came from the same social class, and from the same county, as Shakespeare. Her father was a builder who became bailiff on the estate of Francis Newdigate at Albury, Warwickshire, where Marian was born on November 22, 1819. Mr. Bullett recalls the wave of startled re-action which was sweeping over England at that time. "In the garish light of what had happened in France, religious observances were seen as a patriotic duty: the landed gentry on the one hand, and the large employers of labour on the other, lost no time in enlisting God on the side of firm government, government whose first care it was to keep the lower orders busy and quiet." A land agent's household was likely to be representative of this fearful conservatism, and it is certain that the girl spent the first twenty years of her life walled in by conventions symbolized by squire and parson. The smoke of industrialism, under which the benefits of the Christian faith remained unripened and such sour grapes, was creeping over the country, dyeing it in the characteristic murk of the nineteenth century.

Such was the general tone of the world in which Marian Evans had to find her niche. After schooling at Nuneaton and Coventry, she went home at sixteen (following her mother's death) to keep house for her father. She also worked at French, Italian, German and music, and for a time became obsessed by religious asceticism.

The making of literary friendships, however, soon awakened the girl to her own true self, and to her capabilities. She rebelled against the faith and ideas amid which she had grown up, and a quarrel with her father ensued. It was patched up, however, and they were still living together when he died. Her grief was a gate to greater freedom, and she was soon out into the world and at the beginning of her career. Mr. Bullett's skill in portraiture here is admirable. By collecting extracts from contemporary accounts, and linking them with his own sensitive commentary, he presents both her person and her character so vividly that the readers feels an actual contact with her. And from that moment until the end of the biographical section of the book she lives and moves and grows, gaining stature and a public recognizability without losing her real self. It is no easy matter to continue to perceive a personality beneath increasing cloaks of success, with their burdensome weight. It is Mr. Bullett's undiminishing sympathy that here makes him succeed.

Though never beautiful, even in youth, Marian Evans carried openly the signs of her great mental power and her genius. "She was then about one-and-twenty," says the first friend who recognized her latent power, "and I can well recollect her appearance

and modest demeanour as she sat down on a low ottoman by the window, and I had a sort of surprised feeling when she spoke, at the leisured, highly cultivated mode of expression, so different from the usual tones of young persons from the country." That voice was widely noticed. Herbert Spencer was attracted by it. "In physique there was, perhaps, a trace of that masculinity characterizing her intellect; for though of but ordinary feminine height she was strongly built. The head, too, was larger than is usual in women . . . Striking by its power when in repose, her face was remarkably transfigured by a smile; but with her smile there was habitually mingled an expression of sympathy, either for the person smiled at or the person smiled with. Her voice was a contralto of rather low pitch and I believe naturally strong. On this last point I ought to have a more definite impression, for in those days we occasionally sang together; but the habit of subduing her voice was so constant, that I suspect its real power was rarely if ever heard. Its tones were always gentle, and, like the smile, sympathetic." Emerson saw her when she was twenty-two, and recorded "that young lady has a calm, serious soul."

The general tone of Mr. Bullett's portrait is in the same key as that phrase from Emerson. He quotes from her early journalism when she was a young woman in Fleet Street. "The fundamental faith for man is faith in the result of a brave, honest, and steady use of all his faculties." That shows her after she had lost her Christian orthodoxy. Mr. Bullett comments: "This was George Eliot's own faith, and being what she was, a rationalist in the broader but not in the narrower sense of the term, we can be sure that when she said 'all his faculties' she meant just that. Sympathy, the vital impulse of the heart, was for her the light of the world. Love guided by reason, but not originating in it, was the sum of her religious creed."

But Mr. Bullett is not too solemn, nor hagiographic. Little phrases here and there show his detachment and coolness of judgment. He says that Spencer "fell heavily into friendship with her"; a most concise description of a subtle relationship. And in his summing up at the end of the portraiture, he concludes that "she seems to have had almost no capacity for unreflecting joy. She was an inveterate moralizer even of her pleasures. In work she could sometimes forget herself, and live—but her mind in repose was apt to be 'sad'—not necessarily with sorrow, but with the heavy sadness of an ill-cooked cake."

That detachment is even more marked in Mr. Bullett's assessment of the novels. I think he is too severe on *Romola*, which he says is a complete failure. Surely the character of Tito is remarkable in its relentless portrayal of the fruits of moral cowardice? And the setting of Savonarola's Florence is as vivid as that given in Merejkowski's *The Forerunner*, which has the same setting?

The fact remains, however, that George Eliot has been less read of late years than the other major Victorians. Is it due to what Mr. Bullett believes to be her cardinal and persistent fault? "Nearly all the Victorians indulged in didactic asides to the reader, but with George Eliot the habit was something more than a mere following of literary fashion. It arose from something in her character which, whether innate or acquired, was ineradicable: an ingrained Puritanism, an excess of conscientiousness, a felt need to give to the practice of art a moral justification." And he says later, and more humorously: "if you are a character in a George Eliot novel the chief thing you have to fear is your author's unqualified moral approval. If that cannot destroy your pretension to reality, nothing can. Not only by commentary, but in the subtler processes of characterization, by the very speeches she puts into your mouth and your mind, she will do her best to expose you for what you are, or what you would be but for her own imaginative power, a walking shadow, a garrulous embodiment of qualities she is resolved to admire."

But he maintains, in spite of such searching criticism, that "among the great novelists of her time she alone, who theologically speaking denied its existence, was deeply concerned with the human soul."

A HANDBOOK OF SOCIOLOGY,

by William F. Ogburn and Meyer F. Nimkoff. *The International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction.* Kegan Paul, 25s.

The publication of this book of 644 pages coincided with the untimely death of Dr. Karl Mannheim, Professor of Education at London University, the founder of the International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction, which in a few years has given us much enlightenment on complex sociological problems. The present volume, written by two American professors of sociology, is not only what a handbook is expected to be, a concise guide. Sociology is still an infant science embracing all the conditions, habits, attitudes and regulations of social life and therefore a host of phenomena and facts which can hardly be scheduled one by one. The index of the book testifies to completeness, for it records, apart from the more general sociological problems, such heterogeneous items as "Zionism", "weather", "the differing tests-intelligence of twins", "hysteria in cities", "domestication of animals and plants" and the "English language".

But however widespread and disintegrated the scope of sociology may be, writers of a "handbook" should attempt to bring some systematical order into this labyrinth and it is that order which is lacking. Would it not have been appropriate to acquaint the sociological student in at least one chapter with the history and development of sociology and to give some bibliographical and critical account of the work done by sociological pioneers? Far from presenting a methodical structure this book, well written and full of interesting observations, provides us with essays on certain aspects of sociology; it deals with selected factors in the social life of man, with culture, human nature, collective behaviour, communities, social institutions and social change. All in all it impresses the reader with much learning in various economic,

social and sociological fields, but at the end he will still ask the question which so many have asked before: what is sociology?

While the authors, whose knowledge is to a large extent based upon specifically American experiences, are on many occasions at pains to adduce detailed facts and trends as a proof of their arguments, they are here and there apt to leave the reader with some superficialities. For instance, when dealing with Malthusian theories of population they claim that "in England at the close of the eighteenth century . . . the food supply could only be increased by adding more land to the cultivated areas," and they forget that the law of diminishing returns as applied to already cultivated soil was as much a handicap as the limitation of land itself. Similar superficialities are found in the last chapter where the authors acquaint us with their conception of social planning.

Also they say: "Planning has the virtue of looking ahead, which is essential in a changing society." It is, indeed, a virtue to look ahead and the careful British businessman cannot be said to have lacked this great quality in the past. While his success expressed itself in Britain's increasing wealth, the success of long-term plans in a quickly changing society has yet to be proved. When the authors contend that planners lay their emphasis "on the practical rather than on aspirations of the fantasy type" a good deal might be said at the present moment to reverse this assumption.

In spite of such superficialities however the parts of the book which concentrate on special sectors of sociology deserve praise. But there is no real interlocking between the material analysed in these parts and the general conclusions to which the authors lead their readers. Sociology still remains a science which is apt to become enigmatic when the attempt is made to draw a theory from the mass of intermingled phenomena.

HURMANN LEVY.

ADULT EDUCATION: THE RECORD OF THE BRITISH ARMY, by T. H. Hawkins and L. J. F. Brimble. *Macmillan*. 15s.

In one of the reports prepared by the Adult Education Committee of the Board of Education, the scope of adult education was defined as extending "to every aspect of life in which men and women have interests upon which the processes of thought can throw light, and to all the pursuits of leisure which have a cultural value, and which are therefore a means towards a good life." It is in this sense that adult education has been interpreted in H.M. Forces, and the whole of the work which has been planned in the past seven years—not excluding the plan for the future of Army education announced by the Secretary of State for War in March 1947—has to be viewed in the light of this definition.

One of the remarkable developments during the Second World War was, as the authors of *Adult Education: The Record of the British Army* rightly emphasize, "the growth of education in His Majesty's Forces"; and it is to an examination of the educational work developed to meet what the Haining Committee described as "the greater variety of needs of the wartime as opposed to the peacetime Army" that Major Hawkins and Mr. Brimble have devoted the greater part of the present study. At the same time, they are to be congratulated on having resisted the temptation to confine their analysis to those developments which were devised to combat wartime conditions and the educational problem created by the demobilization of large numbers of civilians. By including an authoritative, comprehensive and documented history of the educational provisions in the British Army from the days of the first regimental schools to the outbreak of the late war they have performed a major service. As they suggest "the work may not have been spectacular," but education had won an established place in the training of

peacetime recruits. The negotiations which were commenced in 1939, and which resulted in the creation of the Central Advisory Council and the appointment of the Haining Committee, marked the rebirth—and not, as has frequently been assumed, the birth—of Army education.

In writing of the wartime and release schemes, Major Hawkins and Mr. Brimble have made the fullest use of official documents; but they have enriched these with a wealth of personal experience and knowledge. Their account of the changes and experiments which have characterized educational work in the Army in the past seven years has a twofold merit: it is both balanced and inclusive. The vast organizational changes which wartime conditions necessitated, the work of A.B.C.A., the preparation of correspondence courses to meet a variety of individual needs, the establishment of education centres, the provision of basis education, and the development of facilities for the practice of the arts and handicrafts—all these have a place in the narrative. Nor are those aspects of the work with which the authors were not personally concerned treated less generously. Separate chapters are devoted to "Education Overseas", "The British Liberation Army", and "Prisoners of War"; and the scope of the education scheme for the release period is also discussed.

Because this study will appeal to many who have had no part in shaping the developments so ably described, it is, perhaps, regrettable that the authors have abandoned the rôle of chroniclers. The final section, in which they attempt to suggest how some of the wartime schemes can be adapted to meet civilian needs, is incomplete and unconvincing—partly because much progress has been made in the year which has passed since the manuscript was completed, and partly because the selection of topics is narrowly arbitrary. More misleading, however, is the chapter entitled "Criticisms and Comments" which concludes the account of

the wartime schemes. Many of the criticisms require revision in the light of the fuller information which is now available; too many of the comments are quotations.

J. MACKAY-MURE.

DEMOCRACY AND CIVILIZATION, by Geraint Vaughan Jones.
Hutchinson. 21s.

This book, as its title implies, is a contribution to the problems of contemporary civilization including politics. In the main it is concerned with theology, politics, the meaning of history and, in a lesser degree, philosophy, although it "is not intended primarily for the philosopher or the theologian, but for the 'intelligent reader' who is as puzzled and as disturbed as is the author by the state of contemporary civilization . . ." First and foremost, however, the author is a Christian thinker and his arguments are resolved, and the present crisis interpreted, in the light of Christian understanding and beliefs.

"A Christian philosophy," says the author, "begins not with politics but with a conception of life, in which politics have a necessary place." This is fundamental to his argument and following from it he reminds his readers "that politics and morals are indissociable from each other." At the same time the Christian philosophy of life is centred around the creative and the free. Thus, from the Christian standpoint, the most desirable political form is one which encourages the creative in the individual and gives him his freedom (as distinct from anarchy). It follows naturally from this, says the author, that "democracy, having as its basis a particular conception of man, is the most 'Utopian' form of political theory." Mr. Jones then affirms his belief in a Protestant democracy, "for the record of the Roman Catholic Church as a tolerant community is not very inspiring," and in a liberal democracy "because democracy by itself does not necessarily imply the preservation of the values

which have come to be organic to Western Civilization."

The study of the meaning (if any) of history is considered at length and in detail. Although it may be true that "We do not know whether Western civilization is static, disintegrating, or advancing" and that, in the words of J. B. Bury, "it cannot be proved that the unknown destination towards which man is advancing is desirable," we must surely agree that "it is through the redemption of man that history itself will be redeemed." If man himself can be redeemed from his past sins, need we suppose that the same is not true of a living generation in relation to past history? Not to accept this, is to admit defeat. The author concludes this part of his review with the statement that "the purpose of history is the development of individuals into free beings who can be called the children of God . . ."

These, we may say, are the two main themes running throughout the book. First, has history a meaning and, if so, what is it, and how is history made? Secondly, the idea that the development of an "open" society is essential if Christianity is to become, and remain, alive. Among other aspects of life considered are the possibility of the recovery by democracy of a militant form in the post-war world; the way in which world democratic government might, and could, conform with Christian beliefs; and the dangers inherent, in the form of the demonic, when we accept freedom and when we interest ourselves in the creative and in being creative. As far as the last-mentioned is concerned, we are left with the firm conclusion that the only way to combat the demonic, which is a part of the creative, is through Christianity and agape.

Any Christian approach to problems of the day must inevitably devolve into consideration of individual men and women, for Christianity is so basically concerned with the individual. Not only do we need to know the truth about political,

The Great Globe Itself

*By the United States Ambassador
to the U.S.S.R., 1933-36*

William C. Bullitt

In this closely reasoned and fully documented book, Mr. Bullitt expresses the challenging view that the threat of war from the Soviet Union is ever-present as a natural corollary of the 'Communist creed' which calls for the conquest of the world. Quoted communist writings and a revealing comparison, with facts and dates, between Nazi and Soviet action with regard to treaties and international law are contained in the appendices. "Here is the sanest account which we have come across of the realities of the present international situation. It is written with great simplicity and clarity and for the ordinary reader . . . Buy it, read it and lend it." *Catholic Herald*.

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★

MACMILLAN & Co., Ltd.

economic and social problems but, as the author says, the people in high places, because they are human and, therefore, liable to error and open to temptation, must in the future be imbued with a high sense of moral responsibility.

Of all forces and trends in society, the moral one is perhaps the most difficult for a living generation to see in itself. We do not know what moral forces may be afoot at the present time. New outbursts of moral energy may be in part caused by reaction against excessive materialism. *Democracy and Civilization* may be symbolic of, and contributing towards, a moral re-awakening.

R. S. BURLS.

THE GREAT GLOBE ITSELF,
by William C. Bullitt. *Macmillan*.
8s. 6d.

This book, written by a former Ambassador of the U.S.A. in Moscow, is a

statement of the extreme anti-Soviet position. It is written with force and logic, and without qualification or refinement. According to Mr. Bullitt, one issue dominates the world situation, democracy against Communism, and the only effective course is to create "a Defence League of Democratic States." The Soviet Union is "a totalitarian dictatorship, controlled by men who by their own volition, by their own free will, deliberately and consciously, have chosen to declare themselves the enemies of all peoples who live in freedom." Lenin himself said ". . . it is inconceivable that the Soviet republic should continue for a long period side by side with capitalist states. Ultimately one or the other must conquer. Meanwhile a number of terrible clashes . . . is inevitable." "The aim of Soviet foreign policy is constant," Mr. Bullitt declares, "to establish Communist dictatorship throughout the earth."

There is nothing unfamiliar in this general analysis, and even the view that the late President Roosevelt was out-maneuvred by Marshal Stalin into selling European freedom when, by standing out for a guarantee of the 1939 frontiers at the time when Russia desperately needed material help from the United States, he might have preserved it, is not novel. Incidentally, if the analogy between Hitler and Marshal Stalin is as close as Mr. Bullitt suggests, it would be interesting to know why he should attach any value to any such undertaking. What is perhaps more remarkable than his views in themselves is that a man of Mr. Bullitt's standing should have allowed his head to control his head to the extent that he has done in his mode of expressing them. For, even if the Soviet system be an evil thing and the menace to the rest of the world that Mr. Bullitt suggests, it is hard to believe that his development of his theme is adequate.

It really is not enough to say that the Soviet system is "a much more efficient and unscrupulous Tsardom." Such good social democrats as the Webbs found it an absorbingly interesting social experiment. It seems at least unlikely that a mere military tyranny backed by a fifth column should have exerted the influence on European life and thought that the Soviet has had. Why, to ask only one question, should such willing and efficient fifth columns be found? If Communism is a menace, it is only by seeking to answer such a question as this last that the true source of its danger can be found. It is not because his analysis is wrong—it may or may not be so—that Mr. Bullitt's arguments are unsatisfactory, but because he does not give sufficient evidence to confirm it, or make a serious effort to analyse the causes of Russia's military and diplomatic successes.

None the less, Mr. Bullitt's book, refreshingly vigorous and sincere, is particularly relevant to the present time, for it unquestionably reflects the opinion that a large number of Americans hold

and express about General Marshall's Harvard speech. It shows the immense difficulty of any rapprochement between Russia and the States, and it is worth mentioning that Mr. Bullitt permits himself one good quip in a reference to "the replacement of the right of habeas corpus by the right of habeas cadaver."

W. T. WELLS.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, by Sir Gilbert Campion, K.C.B. Macmillan 18s.

The reviewer called upon to discuss a book written on a complex subject by the world's greatest authority on that subject necessarily approaches his task with diffidence. The procedure of the House of Commons, compounded as it is of Standing Orders, case law, precedent and historical survivals, is complex enough to those who live very close to it: and there can be no doubt that Sir Gilbert Campion is the leading authority on it in the world to-day. He holds this position by dual right. First, he is the Clerk to the House of Commons, and therefore the senior of the small professional *corps d'élite* who are, as it were, the Civil Service of Parliament. Secondly, he is the editor of the current edition of Erskine May's *Parliamentary Practice*, which is the standard authority on Parliamentary procedure.

Sir Gilbert's Introduction is not, of course, intended as a rival to the compendious learning of Erskine May. It is in his own words, intended as "a practical guide to the procedure of the House of Commons." It is, however, more than that: it is also an eminently readable book on Parliamentary procedure, a claim that can scarcely be made for Erskine May. There is in the world one enthusiast who has read Erskine May from cover to cover thirteen times: but such industrious devotion must be as rare as it is admirable. For most people it is a book of reference only, to be consulted for the authoritative interpretation of

specific and vexed questions. Sir Gilbert's book, on the other hand, while having considerable value for reference and quotation—except on points of order in the House, where Erskine May alone has binding authority—is primarily a book to be read from cover to cover, with rare profit and pleasure, by the growing band of people interested in Parliamentary procedure and the history of its development.

The form of the book is well suited to this purpose. It begins with a sketch of the historical development of Parliamentary procedure, short but lucid and indispensable as background. Thereafter it proceeds to another background sketch of Parliamentary law and machinery, before coming to the main business of describing Parliament in action, both on the floor and in its varied committees. There is a chapter dealing with the work of committees, a comparatively modern element in the Parliamentary system, and another dealing with finance. This last is a very useful chapter, not least because to the layman there must often seem to be a confusing inconsistency of theory with practice in this part of Parliament's business due to the modern tendency to use the machinery of financial control to initiate discussions on policy.

This is the second edition of Sir Gilbert's book, appearing eighteen years after the first. But for the war it would have appeared considerably earlier, for a second edition was in print in 1937. Publication was, however, deferred until the publication of the fourteenth edition of Erskine May, to which many references are necessarily made and which was in turn delayed by the war. Sir Gilbert has, however, incorporated in the text matter dealing with developments since the first writing. Thus there is, for example, an appendix on the Emergency Procedure necessitated by war, and valuable new material on the various aspects of delegated legislation, which have assumed so much wider an importance since the first edition of the book.

THE PARADOX OF NATIONALISM

by **Julius Braunthal**
Introduction by **Leonard Woolf**
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Some descriptions of procedure read a little strangely to-day. For instance, there is now no White Paper or Order Book issued to Members, in these days of scarcity of paper; and the Blue Paper has turned a sickly green. The references to Private Members' time now evokes only nostalgic regrets, though perhaps this, with the White Paper and the Order Book will return in ampler days. It is perhaps a pity that Sir Gilbert was not able to include reference to the reports of the Select Committee on Procedure, which has reported during the lifetime of the present Parliament, since in it are contained some of the signposts to the future.

But these are small points, and do not constitute a blemish on an interesting, authoritative, and readable book, which can confidently be commended alike to members of Parliament and members of the public.

DEREK WALKER-SMITH.

ARGENTINA, by Norman Mackenzie,
Gollancz, 6s.

The value of this book is not so much in its well documented attack on President Perón, as in its placing of him in historical perspective. Mr. Norman Mackenzie shows that the basic conflict in Argentina during recent years has been that of the land-owner *versus* the industrialist. So long as Argentina possessed no domestic industry, the national economy was almost entirely subservient to that of Great Britain. Cattle and grain were exchanged for railways, barbed wire, agricultural machinery, and every kind of manufactured goods. Argentina was in fact Britain's sixth dominion. The Argentine land-owners were naturally opposed to tariffs, as these would have fostered local industry and upset the international economic balance. Therefore, politically, the landowners were (and are) Conser-

The earliest change in this state of affairs occurred during the first world war, when the supply of manufactured articles declined, and not even the Argentine

estancieros could prevent the production locally of (as Mr. Mackenzie puts it) "shoes, saucepans, bedsteads and so forth." In the political sphere, these industrial interests were supported by the Radical party, who of course were no more revolutionary than the land-owning Conservatives but did represent the newer tendency in the national life. The power of the land-owners was undermined, however, not by the Radicals, but by the world slump of 1929, which resulted in a drop in the demand for Argentine foodstuffs and provided a very real indication of the degree in which Argentine economy was at the mercy of the country's principal customer—Great Britain. "The good old days could not be conjured back."

At this point more and more Argentines began to feel (in Mr. Mackenzie's words) that "it was high time that the Argentine economy was run by Argentines for themselves." Thus was born Argentine nationalism. Domestic industry continued to grow, and "by the time the second world war broke out in 1939, the traditional partnership of Argentine agriculture and British industry was beginning rapidly to disintegrate." Yet the political groups which opposed the land-owning oligarchy still (with the exception of the small and mild Socialist Party) had no clear social policy, and they were profoundly divided among themselves.

The second world war accelerated enormously the growth of Argentine industry. Temporarily the internal struggle was postponed, since the foreign demand for Argentine foodstuffs was intensified, without menacing in any way the domestic industrialists (import of manufactured goods having almost entirely stopped). It became evident, however, that at the end of the war the fundamental rivalry would have to be terminated. It was then that General Perón stepped into the arena with a social and economic policy calculated to win the support of the working-class. His policy included wholesale increases in the wages of the lower-paid

workers, enforced reductions in rent and a programme of social insurance. His direction of national affairs was immediately seen to be not only demagogic and ruthless, but also imaginative and coherent. He brought into articulate participation in the life of the nation a whole new social class, the men and women on whom depended the future prosperity and power of Argentina. Neither the reactionary *estanciero* nor the capitalist factory-owner could withstand this avalanche. Henceforth agriculture and industry were to serve the interests, not of foreign countries and individual rentiers, but of Argentina herself. Agriculture and industry were not to be rivals, but complementary forces in the realization of Argentine independence. As Mr. Mackenzie says, the traditional political parties had failed to solve a long-standing crisis; democracy was vacillating and inefficient; reform was deeply desired by the mass of the people—and, since the taking up of the crusade by someone was ultimately inevitable, the emergence of an energetic military officer in the rôle of saviour was not in itself a surprising event. It was Argentina's misfortune that the intervention, when it came, introduced not merely a number of much-needed reforms, but also many of the most unpleasant features of the totalitarian way of life.

'J. C. DEL VALLE'.

THE GREAT CHALLENGE, by Louis Fischer. Cape. 18s.

The opening sentence of Chapter IV—"I find it endlessly exciting to look back over the recent past . . ." stamps Mr. Louis Fischer's new book as yet another of these solemn egotistical commentaries on world affairs which are periodically thrown off—or thrown together—by eager American newspapermen. A sequel to *Men and Politics* (1939), this record of free-lance roving during the war—which included visits to this country, India and Palestine—and high thinking on the major issues of contemporary poli-

tics, specifically on the central problem of the relationship between Russia and the rest of the world, was no doubt calculated to make its American readers feel good—and was lapped up at the time by a public awakening wide-eyed to the existence of such problems. At this distance, and in these latitudes, the information imparted and the observations are almost unbearably trite and obvious.

Mr. Fischer knows quite a lot about Soviet Russia—he is the author of a book *The Soviet and World Affairs* and a renegade Stalinist; so that he does understand the nature of the challenge which is the principal theme of his book. As he says, "Russia is Peter armed with Marx." He appreciates the weapons, the only weapons, with which the challenge can be met; it is a question of effecting betimes those social, economic and political reforms in our Western sphere of influence which will cut the ground from its Communist besiegers. The formula is:

"WHOSOEVER will, let him take the WATER of LIFE freely". (Rev. xxii., 17)

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"Block Russia's territorial expansion by an effective international organization and block Russia's ideological expansion by increasing the contentment and cohesion of the countries in her path." Not for Mr. Fischer to say how this is to be done : he is a lay preacher, not really a student of politics.

WILLIAM RYDAL.

FOUR CENTURIES OF WITCH BELIEFS, by R. Trevor Davies. *Methuen.* 15s.

In this well written and documented thesis there is unfolded one, amongst the many perhaps, of the tragedies of our national history. The great witch terror, which swept the country during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, had its origin in no more than a surmise based, on what Mr. Davies assumes, to have been "superstition and pure delusion." It is of that prevailing supposition and its consequences, as the complexity of the subject demands, that the author writes with admirable clarity of style, maintaining throughout a scientific impartiality.

For the layman, the witch now leaves far behind the bounds of the nursery, and those of *Macbeth* become a too real part of Shakespeare's England. The paradoxical war, when heinous crimes are committed in the name of the Christian religion, finds here a new and grim reality, in method equal only to that of the Gestapo, and of those who sent thousands on their way in the tumbrils of the French Revolution. It should be realized, however, that the instigators of these horrors were, for the most part, and according to the dictates of their conscience, fighting the most atrocious perversions and loathsome degradations of the Christian tenets. The votaries of this hypothetical evil were found usually to be of the aged, particularly women ; but there was an additional undue employment of children as mediums. The facility afforded to informers, and the unscrupulous futility of the trials, led to executions on the slightest pretext.

Disregarding witchcraft superstitions in

this country prior to the accession of Elizabeth, which were treated with comparative indifference and if need be kept under control, it seems that the contact in which they had been placed with pseudo-scientific witch beliefs on the Continent, was the main stimulus for the returning Marian refugees to lay blame on the many tragic victims of the English countryside. In so much that the national traits of character had remained unaltered, these Protestants must be said to have fanned the fires of the first great witch terror.

The alternating fall and rise of witch mania under the successive reigns is well traced, and the interdependent causes, divided mostly between the striving factions of Roman Catholicism and Calvinism, Royalist and Cromwellian, nicely weighed ; although the balance in these centuries comes down on the side of the Puritan. Roman Catholicism in the middle of the thirteenth century condemned witchcraft as heresy, and from thenceforward the stringency of the Inquisition aggravated the fear. At the time of the Reformation this was intensified to a manifold degree owing to the Puritan doctrine of original sin, and the depravity of man.

This valuable exposition is the result of wide reading. It incorporates the issues of recent research during the last twenty years, and includes wisely selected passages on the subject from contemporary writers of the period, many of whom were to be numbered amongst the leading statesmen and ecclesiastics, whose books now are seldom to be encountered.

The outstanding question which Mr. Davies investigates, is that of the probable rôle played by the witch terror in the fall of Charles I and the institution of the Protectorate. For this, he offers a well prepared argument, in the portrayal of the enlightening scientific influence permeating the upper classes during the latter years of James I's reign, and of the tolerance of the Arminians, together with the attempt on the part of Charles I and his Council to extinguish the witch mania. The reluctance of the Royalist members

of the Long Parliament to make prosecutions incited the opinions of the nation, now for many years grounded in the fear of witch terror, and had its own influence in the rift between the members, the majority of whom represented the Calvinistic south-eastern counties. Although, possibly, much turns upon future research, it was this, Mr. Davies suggests, which finally turned the tide against the King and the Royalist party.

FRANCES PAUL.

THE DICKENS STUDENT AND COLLECTOR, compiled by William Miller. *Chapman & Hall.* 30s.

In bibliographies it is helpful when the title acts as a keynote so that the reader may know what to expect, but here the title gives the lie—even if it is the *Lie Direct*. However Touchstone need not be worried unduly, because the author states his aim clearly: it is to compile a bibliography not of the writings of Charles Dickens, but rather one devoted solely to the ana which concerns and bears upon his life and works. Such an objective immediately recalls a similar task carried out by the late F. G. Kitton—although Mr. Miller's handicap of beginning over fifty years later this time proves to be more of an advantage than a drawback. Since 1886 much has been said upon Carlyle's "Honest Man", and a good deal of material which was unavailable to Kitton has been unearthed.

Take one example: the music section. Whereas Kitton lists twenty-three items, Mr. Miller, as Mr. Robert H. Haynes points out in the introduction to the new volume, sets down two hundred and forty-eight; and in this division, as elsewhere, the compiler has made no attempt to catalogue all the articles that have appeared in the press, but merely the most vital and important. Nor is the pursuit of this type of contribution as easy as it seems, for it is only the strong man with a resolute mind who is not swayed by current fancies and who, despite will o' the wisp whittings, can maintain his true

independence of judgment. On this score Mr. Miller acquits himself well. He has arranged his Dickensiana in nine parts: the opening one relates to the man himself and his works whilst the others are grouped round poetical, dramatic, musical, anthological, plagiaristic and bibliographical aspects of the same subject. By far the largest section is the critical one which is sub-divided into four: into reviews of individual works, the letters of Charles Dickens, Forster's *Life*, and writings of an appreciative and depreciative nature about the novelist and his books. It is the latter which is the most interesting division.

Some years ago Mr. Hugh Kingsmill edited an anthology of *What they said at the time*. In it, in a chapter devoted to Dickens, he selected the famous review of 1838 of *Pickwick Papers* from the *Quarterly Magazine*: "he has risen like a rocket, and he will come down like a stick" (a phrase which, be it noticed, was originally used by Thomas Paine in an attack upon Burke). There the quotation ended, and Dickens's reply—"I will watch for that stick, Mr. Lockhart, and when it comes down, I will break it across your back"—was not included. So it is on looking through Mr. Miller's book, retorts which were perhaps once noted in the lower third or on a long train journey, come back, as it were through a pelmanistic process, as one flicks over the pages. This, at least, is one of its minor virtues. Its other virtues, over which Mr. Miller is so modest that his preface only covers a score of lines, are legion—the four cardinal ones being precision, scholarship, reverence and accuracy.

NEVILLE BRAYBROOKE.

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BOOKS ON THE TABLE

RETURNING from the Kerry Drama Festival at Killarney and the adjudications of Mr. Lennox Robinson, the Abbey Theatre producer and a playwright too little seen in London now, it was "sweet chance" to find on the table *THE OTHER THEATRE* by Norman Marshall (*John Lehmann*. 15s.). Every evening deserving the prize for the 'best individual performance', Mr. Robinson's manner—tentative, courteously absentminded, gentlest of all for blame (in fact, in Irish, he is the darling man)—wholly failed to disguise the shrewdness of his judgments and his ripeness in plays and acting.

'Non-commercial' theatre

For comparison's odious sake it was necessary to turn first to Mr. Marshall's chapter on "The Amateur Theatre". And here the criticism is naked: "few amateurs believe they have much to learn from the professional," and "the amateur has only himself to blame if he has contributed so little of importance to the theatre as a whole."

In stating that his book "is no more than a personal record" Mr. Marshall is less than fair to himself. Of course the director and owner of the Gate Theatre should devote a couple of chapters to that courageous and worthwhile experiment, and of course the producer of several 'West End' successes should write pertinent paragraphs on the 'commercial' theatre. But the sections on the Oxford Playhouse, the Lyric at Hammersmith, the Cambridge Festival Theatre, the Sunday theatre, the Old Vic, English ballet and the repertories outstrip merely autobiographical interest, and make the whole an indispensable history of the 'other' theatre to the thoughtful playgoer. Only one omission seems regrettable: in the index of plays, theatres and companies the wretched authors might have been included against the first. The numerous illustrations recall pleasant mem-

ories and induce regret for good things missed.

The Wesleys

The endeavours lately used to procure subscriptions for building a new playhouse in Bristol give us not a little concern . . . Though John Wesley wrote these words it must not be supposed that the Methodism of his day was entirely opposed to the theatre, and the great spell-binders were quick to see and use the connection between stage and pulpit. Did not Garrick say that he would give £100 if he "could only say 'Oh!' like Mr. Whitefield"? *METHODISM AND THE LITERATURE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY* by T. B. Shepherd (*Epworth Press*. 10s. 6d.) has a chapter on this theme. The book gives a scholarly appraisal (with a comprehensive bibliography) of the effect of the political, educational and literary publications of Wesley and of the poetry of his brother Charles in newly arousing ideas of liberty. Dr. Shepherd substantiates his claim that Methodism prepared the way for the Romantic revival, and the relevant essay is absorbing.

Looking and seeing

Absorbing, too, is a little book *A WAY OF LOOKING AT PICTURES* by Allan Gwynne-Jones (*Phoenix House*. 3s. 6d.) which, though probably intended for those who for any reason suddenly feel an interest in painting, will also help the established I-know-what-I-like gazer to sort out his prejudices. One of the far-reaching curses of childhood is being told by grown-ups what to admire, and Mr. Gwynne-Jones, himself a practising painter who has managed apparently to keep intact his own artistic integrity, is able to give back to his reader something of the clear vision of the very young. He handles nine pictures (which are reproduced), from a Rembrandt to a Picasso, lightly enough to avoid either superim-

posing his own preferences or trying "to train a person to recognize 'good taste'."

To suit all moods

Hazlitt would not of course accept "natural taste" in an art lover as a substitute for "having studied the means"—the "technical notions". The essayist is brought to mind by a tribute to his influence (shared by this reader at the identical age; Hazlitt climbing to the niche occupied by Lamb, just before Chesterton knocked them both over, without however permanent damage) paid by Mr. Malcolm Elwin in *THE PLEASURE GROUND*, edited by him (*Macdonald*. 8s. 6d.). This is a satisfying miscellany of stories, sketches of travel and reflection, philosophical and historical comment, theatre and literary criticism, with a section of poetry. Among so many contributors not to be invidiously singled out, death makes an exception of Elizabeth Myers, whose acute little tale makes one regret afresh, passionately now, that she used her short time here for the writing of three novels which gave only promise when she might have been perfecting her great gift for the short story. This putting of the cart before the horse, to one who felt so surely that only by long practice in the more difficult medium could she discipline her magnificent feeling for words, is tragic.—Short stories are well represented in *MODERN READING 15*, edited by Reginald Moore (*Phoenix House*. 6s.), which maintains the standard of its predecessor previously commented upon in these pages. Poetry has an important place, the extracts from books to come are discriminating, and the photographs of London scenes are in danger of being ripped out for inclusion amongst the books on the shelf special to the subject.

Tales from the East

In their preface to *INDIAN SHORT STORIES* (*New India Publishing Co.* 6s.) the editors, Mulk Raj Anand and Iqbal Singh, affirm that while the ancient fables of India can be regarded as the

prototype of the short story, modern India has been the recipient rather than the transmitter of literary trends, so that contemporary writers are confronted with the problem of how to combine satisfactorily the two. The ensuing collection often shows this conflict, though the first story, by Rabindranath Tagore, is as free from it as was all his work. The two editors are represented, the author of *Untouchable* by a study full of the pity and shock ("and we sat in the terrible darkness of our minds") which characterized that best of his books.—A different aspect of humanity actuates the *FOUR CAUTIONARY TALES* which are translated from the Chinese by Harold Acton and Lee Yi-Hseih (*John Lehmann*. 8s. 6d.). Mr. Arthur Waley's preface explains that the tales were published in 1627 by Fêng Mêng-lung, and seeks to prove their dissimilarity from Boccaccio's *Decameron*: "as well compare Dryden with Beowulf." As far as possible the translators have kept to the original form, which is a mixture of poetry and prose with the insertion of an old story of a familiar character to parallel the modern one. This process is successfully achieved; the renderings are witty and malicious, with a kind of scandalous charm.

The British model

Back to these shores with *ENGLISH STORY*, the seventh of the series edited by Woodrow Wyatt (*Collins*. 8s. 6d.), and to such practitioners in the art as James Hanley and T. O. Beachcroft. These eleven stories appear to justify the contention in the editor's cynical little foreword: "The individual is . . . trying to work out his own salvation amidst a collapsing society: if he succeeds so will society. The writers see this clearly and write about it here."—A spate of revaluations of the force and achievement of H. E. Bates as a short story writer is about due and might well be precipitated by the appearance of his *THIRTY-ONE SELECTED TALES* (*Cape*. 10s. 6d.), a convenient peg on which to hang the ar-

gument. It is not proposed to undertake this re-assessment here beyond noting that all the stories stand for his mature work and have a species of detached tautness about them which should be the envy and probably the despair of the aspiring young.

Two journeys

VAGUE VACATION by Joan Grant (*Arthur Barker*. 8s. 6d.) is written in so sprightly and desperately sophisticated a fashion that it might well be a piece of fiction rather than the personal record of a post-war two-thousand mile car tour of France and Switzerland by the author and her husband. The situations, often comic and maybe calling for humorous treatment, are marred by the facetious note. And did husband and wife ever talk alone so self-consciously as do these two? Nevertheless, this is one of the books on the table that was read at a sitting—quite literally there is not a dull moment.—“Vague vacation” would be a good description of that period in Byron’s life just before he became involved in the Greek struggle for independence. Mark Aldanov’s novel FOR THEE THE BEST (*Cape*. 8s. 6d.) tells of the initiation of Byron into the Carbonari and of the final struggle around Missolonghi. Nicholas Wreden has made the translation from the Russian and, the pet aversion of ‘real-life’-heroes-supplied-with-imaginary-thoughts apart, the book is exciting, not least because of the light thrown on other British personalities, such as Castlereagh and Wellington, from a foreign angle.

Two American novels

The reactions of the critics to the recent over-sweet film portrayal of THE YEARLING by Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings (*Arthur Barker*. 10s. 6d.) kept this reader away, and would have kept her away from the book too had not the editor placed it *willy nilly*, as Mr. Leslie Henson would say, on the table. Now, to make amends, the pleasure that the reading gave must be recorded. It is a

study, entirely faithful to boy-character, of life in the Florida scrub with Jody, his silent father and mother, the dog Julia, and his pet fawn. The book is full of a gentle pathos; one can see why filming it might be the undoing of Hollywood, which could make little (and so, far too much) of this picture of a boy’s passing from childhood:

Somewhere beyond the sink-hole, past the magnolia, under the live oaks, a boy and a yearling ran side by side, and were gone for ever.

—A few hundred miles further west is the mouth of the Mississippi, where the scene of DELTA WEDDING by Eudora Welty (*The Bodley Head*. 8s. 6d.) is laid. Here the family is loquacious enough, with a brilliance convincingly conveyed. All live in a state of excitement: “The truth was, slowness made any Fairchild frantic,” and it must be confessed that the reader finds this exhausting. Some of the action is seen through the eyes of Laura, the motherless cousin on a visit, fascinated as are all small girls by other people’s families. *Delta Wedding* is Miss Welty’s first novel, written with the perception that makes her short stories so good.

“Heaven’s Reflex”

No politics, no foreign affairs, not even Russia on the table this month! But not so strange an experience after staying in a country remote from the problems of to-day; though not from material ones—the over-all standard of living is probably higher in England than in Eire where, in the rural areas at least, the divisions, according to the obsolete lines of the hymn:

The rich man in his castle,
The poor man at the gate

appear to be more sharp. It is a mental and spiritual remoteness there. “But”, firmly said the sapphire-eyed boatman as he rowed us to Innisfallen Island, ‘where learning began’ over twelve centuries ago, “isms are what is wrong with the world.” And who can deny it?

GRACE BANYARD.